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Abstract 
Image processing is of growing interest in computer applications. Since the size of image 
files are generally large and image data is usually highly redundant, using compression 
algorithms provide effective way of increasing communication and storages efficiency. 
JPEG, which is one of the most widely used image compression standards, uses Huff-
man or arithmetic coding for its lossless compression part. With rapid growth of the 
Internet, controlling access to data is of increasing importance and hence encryption 
is of much wider use. Adding security to the algorithm is an attractive proposal as it 
could reduce the overall processing cost of providing secure compressed data. 
A number of methods for combining encryption and compression had been proposed 
and various attacks on these proposals were published. This thesis reviews the known 
proposals for arithmetic coding encryption schemes and examines proposed attacks on 
such systems. We extend the attacks, introduce new ones, and finally propose efficient 
methods of enhancing security of these systems. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Image processing is of growing interest in computer applications. In publishing fields, 
computerized desktop publishing is commonly used and due to the attractiveness of 
the visual presentations, digital images are widely used on the World Wide Web. High 
performance computers have become more affordable and multimedia applications are 
in great demand. Since the required file sizes for images are generally much larger 
than that of texts, data compression is of high importance for enabling efficient use of 
storage and communication channels for digital images. 
1.1 Motivation 
To provide digital images usable in many applications, several standards are proposed. 
JPEG (Joint Photographic Experts Group) standard, officially Recommendation T.81 
by CCITT, is one of the most widely used standards [ITU93]. It provides the spec-
ifications of processes for the conversion between source image data and compressed 
image data, and the specification of coded representations for compressed image data 
and the guidelines of implementation of the processes. It uses two different classes of 
compression. That is, lossy and lossless compression. In JPEG, the lossless compres-
sion follows the lossy compression, which uses DOT (Descrete Cosine Transform). For 
the lossless compression, JPEG specifies Huffman and arithmetic coding as its entropy 
encoder(decoder) to compress(decompress) the DOT coefficients. 
Arithmetic coding is an optimal data compression algorithm originally proposed by 
Pasco and Rissanen [BWC90]. Arithmetic coding encodes a message into a bit string, 
which represents a real number interval in the interval [0,1) [BWC90]. Arithmetic 
coding provides a flexible alternative to the commonly used Huffman compression al-
gorithm and in many applications gradually replaces the latter. 
Encryption algorithms protect data against unauthorized access. With rapid growth 
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of the Internet, controlling access to data is of increasing importance and hence encryp-
tion is of much wider use. Digital images are no exception. It can be proved (Section 
2.3.5) that compressing plaintext before applying the encryption algorithm effectively 
increases the security of the overall system. If a data compression algorithm can be 
made to also provide security, less processing overhead could be expected as a single 
algorithm achieves two goals. 
Witten and Cleary proposed a number of methods for combining encryption and 
compression [WC88]. Subsequently various attacks on their proposals were published 
which clearly showed the need for careful security assessment of any such proposal. 
The results also showed that obtaining security without sacrificing compression ratio 
and processing speed is not an easy task. 
1.2 Objective 
Our objective is to investigate compression-encryption schemes applied to digital im-
ages. The question addressed in this research is whether it is possible to increase 
efficiency, measured in terms of the processing time, by integrating the two processes. 
Our research concentrates on arithmetic encoding encryption schemes. 
It is worth noting that such combination will only be successful if the resulting 
system i) does not considerably reduce compression rate, ii) requires less processing 
time than direct compression followed by encryption and in) can provide demonstrable 
security. 
1.3 Contributions and structure of the thesis 
In this thesis we extend some of the existing attacks to make them more efficient and 
practical and then show new attacks on other variations of arithmetic coding encryption 
schemes. One group of extensions are with regard to determining halving points^ the 
point where the frequencies of the symbols in the model are halved and play a crucial 
role in Bergen/Hogan attack (BH attack for short)[BH93]. We demonstrate efficient 
ways of detecting the halving point by observing the output of the encoder. We also 
show various methods of determining ihe. range when the model is known. The methods 
are efficient and in one case the number of possible values for range is reduced to two. 
Finally we give a summary of common weak points of arithmetic coding encryption 
schemes and propose methods of strengthening the system. 
1.3. Contributions and structure of the thesis 
The thesis is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we give an overview of informa-
tion theory, data compression and security, and then describe details of how arithmetic 
coding works. In Chapter 3, we look at arithmetic encoding encryption schemes, and 
review the known attacks on arithmetic coding encryption schemes. In Chapter 4, we 
demonstrate various new attacks on arithmetic coding encryption schemes. In Chapter 
5, we look at weaknesses of arithmetic coding encryption schemes and propose protec-
tions against the attacks. In Chapter 6, we comment on the combined compression 
and encryption scheme proposed in Chapter 5. Finally in Chapter 7 we summarize our 
results. 
1.4. Notations 
1.4 Notations 
MSB 
LSB 
MSBs 
LSBs 
ip[i 
V'max 
V'min 
Naymbol 
Pi, 
ClW 
ChW 
FW 
F(V'nxax) 
F 
max 
^max 
CiW 
ChW 
hi 
U 
Mi 0 
Si(x,u) 
01 
u 
the most significant bit 
the least significant bit 
the most significant bits 
the least significant bits 
a symbol 
a symbol at the position from the top of the frequency table 
the ith input symbol (in a message) 
a symbol at the top of the frequency table 
a symbol at the bottom of the frequency table excluding the EOF symbol 
(note: the EOF symbol is at the very bottom of the table) 
the number of symbols 
the probability of a symbol ip 
the lower cumulative probability of a symbol ip 
the upper cumulative probability of a symbol Tp 
the frequency of a symbol ip 
the frequency of a symbol i/'max 
the maximum frequency of a symbol i/'max when C/i(V'max) = C'max and all 
other frequencies are 1 
the maximum cumulative frequency (When C/(V'max) reaches Cmax, all 
frequencies are halved.) 
the lower cumulative frequency of a symbol ip 
the upper cumulative frequency of a symbol ip 
the high value at the beginning of the encoding procedure of ith symbol 
the low value at the beginning of the encoding procedure of ith symbol 
the MSBs of the high and low values which are the same 
the order of a model 
the shift function for the output procedure of a coder where i G {0,1} 
the ith output of a coder 
the output size (for a symbol) 
Chapter 2 
Arithmetic coding 
In this chapter we examine arithmetic coding and its implementations. Firstly, we 
briefly review the information theory, data compression systems and security. Next, 
we examine arithmetic coding scheme, outline various implementations and describe 
one implementation in detail. 
2.1 Information theory 
Communication system 
A communication system^ Fig. 2.1, consists of a message source, an encoder, a channel, 
and a decoder. The message source produces messages to be transmitted. The encoder 
performs source coding, which is to convert the messages into a form suitable for the 
transmission. The channel is the medium through which the encoded messages are 
transmitted. The noise may interfere with the communication over the channel. The 
decoder recovers the encoded messages to their original form for the receiver of the 
information. 
Figure 2.1: Communication system 
Uncertainty and entropy 
Information is related to uncertainty. In a communication system, a message is trans-
mitted from an information source. In a discrete source, a message consists of symbols, 
chosen from an alphabet set. When the source emits a message, a message is chosen 
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from the set of all possible messages. Once a symbol is chosen, the uncertainty about 
it is removed. 
If the message source is modeled as a discrete random variable, uncertainty can be 
measured as follows [BP82]. Let X denote a discrete random variable that takes values 
1 < ^ < with probabilities p{xi). Then the average uncertainty is given by 
FM(X) = -S .^ ip(n) l0gp(xi ) . (2.1) 
This is called entropy of the random variable. 
H{X) can be interpreted as the average amount of information obtained after ob-
serving X. For example, assume that in an experiment a fair die is rolled. Each 
number appears with equal chance and so the probability of each number from 1 to 
6 is p{X = 1)= p(X = 2)= p{X = S)= p(X = i)= p{X = b)= p{X = 6) = I 
Then H{X) is given by H{X) = -Ef^ i | log2 | ^ - W 2 I « 2.58 bits. Before rolling 
the die, the average uncertainty over the experiment is 2.58 bits. After the outcome 
of the experiment is known 2.58 bits of information is obtained and the uncertainty is 
removed. 
When we have a pair of discrete random variables X G {2:1, X 2 , x m } s-nd Y G 
{2/1,2/2, •••,2/l}J with joint probability distribution 1 <i < M and I < j < L, 
the joint entropy of X and Y is given by 
H{X,Y) = (2.2) 
Joint entropy satisfies the condition H{X, Y) < H(X) + H{Y) with equality if and 
only if X and Y are independent. The conditional entropy of X and Y is given by 
H{Y\X) = (2.3) 
and satisfies the condition H{Y\X) < H{X) with equality if and only if X and Y are 
independent. 
2.2 Data compression 
Data compression is an outgrowth of information theory. The aim of data compression 
is to find a short description for a message source. 
For a channel with a given capacity compressing messages results in a more effi-
cient use of the channels. There are two types of compression algorithms : lossless 
compression and lossy compression. Our purpose is to assess the security of arithmetic 
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coding so we only look at the lossless compressions. In lossless compression systems 
the compressed data can be used to recover an exact replica of the source output. In 
lossy compression only approximate form of the source output can be recovered. 
2.2.1 Source coding 
The information source may be continuous or discrete. In the former case the source 
output can be represented by a continuous time signal while in the latter case, the 
output is represented by a string of symbols from a finite set. In source coding the 
encoder encodes the output produced by the source into a sequence of codewords. The 
length of codewords may be fixed or variable. An example of a fixed length code is 
ASCII code. Morse code is an example of a variable length code. By assigning shorter 
codewords to more frequent symbols, a more efficient encoding is achieved. 
2.2.2 Optimal codes 
An optimal code is the most efficient code for a given message source. Let the 
source be represented by a discrete random variable, X , that takes value from the 
set {xi ,x2, ...JXM}- In source coding each symbol is encoded into a codeword, which is 
a sequence of symbols from another alphabet set, A = {ai,a2) Let the length 
of the codeword for Xi be U. Assuming that the channel is noiseless, then the most 
efficient code is the one that has minimum average codeword length. 
(2.4) 
An important property of a code is that it should be uniquely decodahle. A code is 
uniquely decodable if any encoded string has a unique source string correspond to it. 
A prefix code is a code such that no codeword is a prefix of any other codeword and 
it is uniquely decodable. Kraft Inequality is a necessary and sufficient condition that 
must be satisfied by a prefix code [Kra49]. For any prefix code over an alphabet A, the 
Kraft inequality is : 
< 1- (2-5) 
The relationship between the entropy and the average codeword length is 
H{X)<hogD. (2.6) 
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Equality holds if and only if ^(xi) = D'^^Wi ; in this case, H{X) = llogD. There 
exist D-ary (alphabet consisting of D symbols) prefix codes which satisfy 
logD - - logD • 
The prefix code with the shortest average length is called optimal prefix code. 
(2.7) 
2.2.3 Constructions of optimal codes 
HufFman code 
A method of constructing an optimal prefix code is given by Huffman [Huf52]. Assume 
we have a set of symbols X = {2:1,2:25 ^m} with probabilities p(xi),p{x2)^ •••^pi^M), 
and letp(xi) > >̂(2:2) > ... > p{xm)- Assume there are D symbols in the code alphabet. 
Then the algorithm is as follows. 
1. Combine D symbols with the smallest probabilities to construct a symbol a:M-i?4-i,...,M 
with probability '^^M-D+iPi^i)^ ^^^ replace Xm-d+i, •••^^m by the new symbol. 
Repeat the procedure until the number of symbols becomes D. 
2. Assign a single codeword symbol to each symbol. 
3. If there is any symbol obtained from combining D symbols, separate it to D 
symbols and append each codeword symbol to the codeword assigned to the 
combined symbol. Repeat the procedure until all original symbols are separated. 
An example is shown in Fig 2.2. The symbol set is X = {1,2,3,4,5} with proba-
bilities 0.25,0.25,0.2,0.15,0.15 respectively and D = 2. 
C(X) X P(X) 
01 1 0.25 \ / \ .0.55 0 
10 2 0.25 \ po.25 \ / ̂ 0 . 3 0 ^ ̂ 0.45 1 
1 1 3 0.2 ^ / l ̂  0.25 0 n ̂ 0 .25 
0 0 0 4 0.15 0' ^ 0 . 2 1' 
0 0 1 5 0.15 1' 
Figure 2.2: Example of Huffman code 
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Shannon-Fano-Elias coding 
Shannon-Fano-Elias coding encodes source symbols using cumulative distribution to 
assign codewords. It is not an optimal coding algorithm but forms the basis of arith-
metic coding, to be discussed in Section 2.4, that is an optimal coding algorithm. 
Let X be a set of source symbols, where X = {1 ,2 , . . . ,M} and the probabilities be 
p{X) = {p(l) ,p(2) , . . . ,p(M)} where p{x) > 0 for all x. Then the cumulative distri-
bution function F{X) is defined as F{x) = We define a function F{X) as 
F{x) = 4- If we use binary representation for F{x) after the decimal 
point, ie. removing 0., with the length l{x) = [log ^ 1 + 1 , we can construct a uniquely 
decodable code. Shannon-Fano-Elias coding assigns an integral number of bits to each 
codewords and in this way it differs from arithmetic coding, which will be discussed 
later. 
Ziv-Lempel code 
A dictionary based compression is given by Ziv and Lempel [ZL78]. By parsing a 
message, Ziv-Lempel coding partitions it into variable-length blocks and constructs a 
dictionary for it. Let a message, X = (xi, X2, ^n)^ be constructed from an M symbol 
alphabet. Then the first entry in the dictionary is Bi = (xi). Then the shortest prefix 
B2 = {x2,..., Xi) of the sequence (2:25 •••'̂ n) is added to the dictionary and the procedure 
is repeated. Each entry in the dictionary is referred to by a pair of integers (j, Xfc) in 
such a way that x^ is the last symbol in Bi and Bj is the sequence obtained by removing 
Xk from Bi. The codewords are given from the pair of integers by M j + Xk. Ziv-Lempel 
code is a universal source coding^ which compresses data without the prior knowledge 
of the source distribution. 
2.2.4 Data compression models 
Statistical compression systems such as Huffman and arithmetic coding can be divided 
into two parts: a model part that predicts incoming symbols, and a coder part which 
uses the information given by the model to encode the incoming symbols into an 
output sequence. If a model is fixed throughout the coding of the message, it is a static 
model and the system is a non-adaptive data compression system. In an adaptive data 
compression system^ the model is updated by the incoming data to reflect the local 
statistics of data. 
In adaptive statistical compression algorithms such as adaptive Huffman or adaptive 
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Encoder Decoder 
Figure 2.3: Data compression model 
arithmetic coding, the probabilities of source symbols and the codewords assigned to the 
source symbols are dynamically updated according to the incoming source messages. 
The encoder can update the distribution of symbols by observing input symbols and 
the decoder can follow the change of the encoder by observing the decoded symbols. 
2.2.5 PPM models 
PPM stands for Prediction by Partial Matching. PPM takes the context into account. 
The probabilities of symbols are given as the conditional probabilities. That is, when a 
symbol Xi is seen in a source after a sequence •••j^i-i, then the probability 
oi Xi following the context - - .^i- i is given by ..., x^.o+i, iCi-o)-
The number of symbols in the context, O, is the order of the model. When the symbol 
with the 0 — 1 preceding symbols is not found in the model, the order is reduced and 
the shorter string in the model, ie. x^-o+i, is looked up. When the order 
drops, a special escape symbol is encoded so that the decoder notices the change of the 
order. When there is no match in the model, equally distributed symbol probabilities 
are used. The model keeps the frequencies of symbols in a tree structure (generally 
called trie). Generally PPM models achieve good compression ratio. The disadvantage 
is that as the order of the model grows, the number of the nodes may increase by the 
exponent of the number of symbols. 
2.3 Security 
2.3.1 Symmetric encryption system 
A symmetric key cryptosystem allows secure communication over an insecure channel 
between two parties who share a key. A symmetric encryption algorithm is a collection 
e = {Ejc : K = 1,2 ' • • N} oi invertible transformations indexed by a piece of informa-
tion called key. To encrypt a plaintext message X , the transmitter who shares a key k 
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with the receiver, finds the ciphertext Y = Ek{X) and sends it to the receiver who can 
use the inverse transformation to recover X. The attacker does not know the key. An 
attacker can always use an exhaustive key search strategy to determine the key and so 
the number of keys gives an upper bound on the security of the system. 
Plain Text 
Encryption 
T 
Cipher Text 
; Insecure Channel 
Plain Text 
Decryption 
1 
Key 
Secure Channel > i 
Figure 2.4: Model of symmetric encryption system 
2 .3 .2 A t t a c k s 
An enemy attempts to find the key, or the plaintext of a ciphertext. An encryption 
system can be attacked by an enemy. There are several attack models as shown below. 
Ciphertext-only attack An attacker knows only the ciphertext. That is, he/she has 
access to Ek{X). This is possible if he/she can eavesdrop the channel. 
Known plaintext attack An attacker knows a set of pairs of plaintexts and their 
corresponding ciphertexts and tries to discover a key or a plaintext which is not 
in the known set. This is possible if he/she can eavesdrop the channel and has 
partial access to the plaintexts. 
Chosen plaintext attack An attacker can choose a plaintext and obtain the cor-
responding ciphertext. This is possible if he/she has access to the encryption 
system and can conduct some experiments. 
Chosen ciphertext attack An attacker can choose a ciphertext and observe the cor-
responding plaintext. This is possible if he/she has access to the decryption 
system and can conduct some experiments. 
2 .3 .3 R e d u n d a n c y of a l a n g u a g e 
A natural language can be seen as a message source and so can be analyzed using 
information theory [BP82]. Let S be the alphabet of a language with M symbols, and 
3 0009 03254668 6 
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S^ denote a string of k characters. Then the rate of language r^ for messages of length 
k is the average amount of information in each character of messages of length k and 
is given by 
Tk - — ^ — . (2.8) 
The absolute rate of a language is the maximum amount of information that could 
be encoded in each character using the alphabet S assuming that all combinations of 
symbols are equally likely. It is given by 
R = \og^M. (2.9) 
The redundancy of a language D with rate r is given by 
D = R-r. (2.10) 
For English, r^ has been estimated as 1.0 to 1.5 bits/letter and R is 4.7 bits/letter. 
High value of R means that English language is highly redundant For a language, 
less redundancy means more statistical independence of the successive characters in a 
message. 
2.3.4 Unicity distance 
When a language is redundant, the knowledge of statistical properties of the language 
can be used to attack an encryption system [BP82]. The unicity distance UA is the 
amount of ciphertext required by the attacker to uniquely identify the plaintext, and 
is given by 
= m . (2.11) 
When the unicity distance is small, the short ciphertext gives enough information to 
uniquely identify the key K and hence the security is weak. By lowering R, that is 
compressing the source and reducing redundancy, unicity distance is increased and a 
more secure system is obtained. Unicity distance is only related to a particular type of 
attack and so large unicity distance does not necessarily mean strong security against 
all attacks. 
2.3.5 Data compression and security 
Compressing a message source before encryption increases the security by removing the 
redundancy from the source messages and increasing the unicity distance. An encryp-
tion algorithm produces ciphertexts that look like random sequence and so have less 
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redundancy. This means that ciphertexts cannot be much compressed. As encryptions 
are now widely in use on many computer systems, compression before encryption is 
an important strategy for efficient use of resources. Combining compression and en-
cryption algorithm has the advantage of added efficiency and automatic compression 
before encryption. 
2.4 Arithmetic coding 
Arithmetic coding is an optimal data compression algorithm. It was discovered inde-
pendently by Pasco and Rissanen [BWC90 . 
Arithmetic coding encodes a message into a bit string which represents a real num-
ber interval within the interval [0,1). It starts with an initial interval, usually [0,1), 
and then narrows it down as new symbols arrive such that the amount of narrowing is 
determined by the probability of the incoming symbol. 
2.4.1 Encoding 
The encoder narrows the interval, [/, h), down based on a pair of cumulative frequencies 
given by a received symbol. Then it outputs the value that represents the interval as 
a sequence of bits. 
Assume that there are Naymboi symbols and a symbol il̂ li] is given a probability 
I <i< Nsy^boh and T.^JT'"'pWj]) = 1- The probability of i;\i] is defined as 
p{ip[0]) = 0 and p{ip[i]) ^ 0 ior 1 < i < N. Then the pair of cumulative probabilities, 
Ch{ip[i]) and ci{ip[i]), for tpli] is given by 
cim) = (2.12) 
(2.13) 
When a symbol ip[i] arrives, the lower bound of the interval I is raised and the upper 
bound h is lowered. That is. 
knew = I + {h - l)Ch{lp\i]) 
(2.14) 
(2.15) 
where Ci{ip[i]) and Ch{ip[i]) are given by (2.13) and (2.13). 
The example Fig.2.5 shows how the interval is narrowed down. Assume that there 
are 10 symbols, that is, Naymboi = 10. Fori < z < N,ymboileti;\i] G {A,B,C,D,E,F,G,H, I, J}, 
and the initial interval is [0,1). Then a message ABC is encoded as follows. 
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1.0-
0.9-
0.8-
0.7-
0 . 6 -
0.5-
0.4-
0.3-
0 . 2 -
0.1-
0.0-
^0.05 -
0.045-
0.04 -
0.035-
0.03 -
0.025-
0.02 -
0.015-
0.01 -
0.005---
0.00 — 
B 
^ 0.0050 — 
0.00475--
0.0045 - -
0.00425--
0.0040 - -
0.00375--
0.0035 - -
0.00325--
0.0030 - -
0.00275- -
0.0025 — 
1.0 
0.9 
0.8 
0.7 
0.6 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
0 .1 - -
0.0 
A B C D E F G H I J 
Figure 2.5: Example of encoding a message "ABC" 
1. The encoder encodes A. The pair of cumulative probabilities are C/,(A) = 0.05 
and c/(A) = 0.0. The interval [0,1) is narrowed down and the new interval is 
hnew = 0.0 -f (1.0 - 0.0) • 0.05 = 0.05 and = 0.0 -f (1.0 - 0.0) • 0.0 = 0.0. 
2. The encoder encodes B. The pair of cumulative probabilities are C/i(B) 0.1 and 
q(B) = 0.05. The interval [0,0.05) is narrowed down and the new interval is 
hnew = 0.0 -h (0.05 - 0.0) • 0.1 = 0.005 and Lew = 0.0 + (0.05 - 0.0) • 0.05 = 0.0025. 
3. The encoder encodes C. The pair of cumulative probabilities are Ck{C) = 0.175 
and c/(C) = 0.1. The interval [0.0025,0.005) is narrowed down and the new 
interval is ĥ êw = 0.0025 -h (0.005 - 0.0025) • 0.175 = 0.0029375 and = 
0.0025 -f (0.005 - 0.0025) • 0.1 = 0.00275. 
Step ChW ciW h I hnew ^new 
1 A 0.05 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.05 0.0 
2 B 0.1 0.05 0.05 0.0 0.005 0.0025 
3 C 0.175 0.1 0.005 0.0025 0.0029375 0.00275 
Table 2.1: Example calculation of the interval for a message ABC 
2.4.2 Decoding 
The decoder transforms encoder's output back into the original symbols. The encoded 
interval is compared with the cumulative probabilities of symbols and the symbol that 
includes the interval is chosen. 
In the example Fig.2.5, the encoded interval is [0.00275,0.0029375). Then the 
cumulative probabilities of each symbol is compared with the interval. The symbol A 
includes the interval so the decoder decodes it. The decoder will choose B as the second 
symbol after seeing A and so on. 
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Notice that the output of the encoder is not a unique interval but any value in the 
interval is sufficient to correctly decode a message. 
2.4.3 Advantage of arithmetic coding 
When a message consists of a sequence of m symbols, V'l? V'2) •••V'mj then the required 
length to encode the message is shown as 
(2.16) 
where p[ipi) is the probability of a symbol ipi. 
The compressed data consists of an integral number of bits. In arithmetic coding, a 
whole message must consist of integral number of bits but each symbol does not have 
such restriction. If the result of encoding a symbol includes a fraction of a bit, it is 
passed to the next symbol. This is the advantage of arithmetic coding over Huffman 
coding. In case of Huffman coding, each symbol should be translated into an integral 
number of bits and so the fraction of a bit is rounded up to a bit if there is any. The 
extra fraction for each output symbol cumulates as encoding proceeds and hence adds 
to the length of the encoded message. 
2.4.4 Models in arithmetic coding 
A model in arithmetic coding is to provide statistics of symbols for the coder. A model 
has great significance in the compression system and largely affects the compression 
ratio. It is obvious from (2.16) that the higher is the probability of an incoming symbol, 
the less is the output length. An arithmetic coding with a model that produces accurate 
prediction can achieve a good compression. 
There are two types of models. A non-adaptive model provides fixed statistics for 
symbols throughout a whole message. An adaptive model provides symbol statistics 
that dynamically change as the frequencies of symbols in a message change. The 
implementation of non-adaptive models will be easier than adaptive ones. However, 
for a message in which the probability distribution of symbols changes, adaptive models 
can achieve better compression. 
There are various approaches to implement a model. The most common approach 
is to use Markov modeling. One of the well known algorithms is Prediction by Partial 
Matching (PPM) [CW84]. The model predicts the next symbol based on O last seen 
symbols. The model is often called order-0 model, based on the number of symbols O 
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used for the prediction. There are some variations such as PPMA and PPMB [Irv95^. 
The model is implemented as a trie which has a tree structure. 
The system can achieve a reasonably good compression with order-3 or order-4 on 
English text. However, according to the data shown in [CW84], the memory require-
ment is large. In the worst case the number of nodes in the tree can grow exponen-
tially. If the order is lower, compression programs such as gzip [Gai93] (which uses 
Ziv-Lempel scheme) or more recently bzip2 [Sew98] (which uses block-sorting scheme 
BW94]) can achieve better compression on text and non-text sources [FB98 
2.5 Implementation of arithmetic coding 
A software implementation of arithmetic coding was developed by Witten/Neal/Cleary 
WNC87] (WNC implementation ). The implementation is order-0 adaptive arithmetic 
encoder/decoder, which means the model consists of the frequencies of symbols. 
2.5.1 The model 
The adaptive model is implemented as an ordered frequency table, where the symbol 
with the highest frequency appears at the top and other symbols are listed in decreasing 
order. Each symbol has a frequency and a cumulative frequency, which is the sum of 
the frequencies of all the symbols below it. The adaptiveness is achieved by updating 
the frequency of a symbol when it is seen in the message sequence. In this case, its 
frequency together with the cumulative frequencies of that symbol and all the symbols 
above it are similarly incremented by 1. If the increment results in the violation of the 
frequency order, the symbol is moved up in the table so that the frequency order is 
maintained. 
Symbol Freq. Cum Freq. 
0 257 
0x00 1 256 
0x01 1 255 
0x02 1 254 
OxFE 1 2 
OxFF 1 1 
EOF 1 0 
Figure 2.6: Implementation of the frequency table 
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2.5.2 The coder 
The coding procedure is realized using finite precision integer arithmetic. The interval 
is represented by two 16 bit numbers representing high and low values. The values 
are updated based on model probabilities and consist of the matched part of the high 
and low values. With the incoming symbol, the new high and low values are 
calculated as 
K = h + [ 
= h + [ 
{hi -
Chi'tpmax) 
- 1 
(2.17) 
Chii^max) 
where ip' is the next symbol below ip in the table and hence Ci{ip) = Chii^') and 
Ch{ipmax) is the sum of all frequencies. 
If h'- and I'- have u common most significant bits, the following step will be executed 
u times : the most significant bit of h'- and I'- that are the same, is sent to the output 
and h'- and I'- are left-shifted. 
Define two functions So{x,u) which left-shifts x by u bits and fills the least signifi-
cant u bits by 0 and Si{x,u) which left-shifts x by u bits and fills the least significant 
u bits by 1. Assuming that h'- and I'- produce output Oi and the size of Oj is u bits, the 
resulting high and low values are as follows 
h'l = Si(h'„u) 
I" = (2.18) 
High value 
Low value 
Before encoding 
1011001101101100 
0000111011101011 
After encoding 
00001110111011 
00001110111011 
11 
01 
After output 
11 
01 
11111111111111 
00000000000000 
Figure 2.7: Output the range 
However, there is a special case. If the interval satisfies 0x4000 < interval < 
OxCOOO, mid-range buffering is used. In this case, 0x4000 is subtracted from both val-
ues, they are left-shifted, and one bit, which is not yet fixed, is stored in b i t s_ to jf ollow, 
which is a mid-range buffer. This bit is determined when the next output bit is deter-
mined. The detail is described in the following section. 
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The output is produced by repeating the procedure above. The algorithm that we 
describe is based on WNC implementation assuming that the size of the high and low 
values is 16 bits. 
How to output bits 
A new range from the old high and low values and the cumulative frequencies of a 
symbol, are calculated by using the following states. 
1. State 1 
The MSB of the high and low values are the same ( ® in Figure 2.8). In this 
case, the MSB is output and the high and low values are left-shifted by 1 bit and 
• 0 is set to the LSB of the low value. 
• 1 to the LSB of the high value. 
2. State 2 
The MSB of the high and low values are different and the low value starts with 
the bit pattern 01 and the high value starts with the bit pattern 10 ( (2) in Figure 
2.8). The following section describes the detail of the procedure in this case. 
3. State 3 
The MSB of the high and low values are different and the bit patterns of the high 
and low values are not in State 2 ( (3) in Figure 2.8). In this case, encoding of 
the symbol finishes. 
© © © 
00 t 00 00 ^ k i L 
01 t r 01 i 01 i i 
10 t k 10 f 10 , 
11 t J r 11 11 r ' r 
Figure 2.8: Possible states of a range 
The procedure of outputting bits proceeds as follows. 
• If the range is either in State 1 or 2, execute the appropriate procedure for the 
state, output bit sequence and update the high and low values. Then, analyze 
the new high and low values according to the states again. 
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If the range is in State 3, finish encoding. 
vj V vj 
® 
Figure 2.9: State transition of the procedures for State 1, 2 and 3 
Special case of the range 
If the high value starts with the bit pattern 10 and the low value starts with the bit 
pattern 01, then 01000000 00000000 is subtracted from both the high and low values 
( Transition from ® to (2) in Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 ). 
Then the two values are left-shifted by 1 bit that is equivalent to multiplying the 
values by two, and 
• the LSB of the low value is set to 0. 
• the LSB of the high value is set to 1. 
( from (D to (3) in Figure 2.10 and Figure 2.11 ). 
Notice that the MSB of the resulting high value is 1 and that of the low value is 0. 
Originally high value starts with 10 and the low value starts with 01. 
When 01000000 00000000 is subtracted from both values the result is that the 
high value starts with 01 and the low value starts with 00. After the left-shift, the 
high value is 1??????????????1 and the low value is 0??????????????0. Hence, the 
result is either in State 2 or 3. 
Then, a unknown hit ( still unknown if it is 0 or 1 ) is put into a special buffer and 
the state of the high and low values is analyzed in the same way again. The unknown 
bits should be fixed when an output bit is produced by the pattern 1. 
If the bit produced is 1, the first output is 1 and the rest of the bits are 0. If the 
bit is 0, the first bit is 0 and following bits are 1. 
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00 , , -
01 r 
10 
^ f " X ^ " N 
11 .J 
Figure 2.10: Special case of the range : Example 1 
® © © 
00 
01 J 
, - ' 1 
c'' -' 
I 
10 ^ t 
11 
Figure 2.11: Special case of the range : Example 2 
For example, if encoding a symbol results in an unknown bit ( (2) in Figure 2.12 ) 
and the first bit of encoding of the next symbol is 0 ( (4) in Figure 2.12 ), the output 
will be 01 ( ® in Figure 2.12 ). 
This can be verified by mapping the range of the next symbol to the range of the 
previous symbol. 
© © © ® 
00 
01 
10 
11 
''5 L 
i 
V 
Figure 2.12: Example of how to fix the unknown bit (1) 
Similarly, if encoding a symbol results in an unknown bit ( @ in Figure 2.13 ) and 
the first bit of encoding the next symbol is 1 ( 0 in Figure 2.13 ), the output will be 
10 ( ® in Figure 2.13 ). 
2.6 Conclusion 
Arithmetic coding is an optimal compression scheme. The performance is largely deter-
mined by the model. The model is generally based on Markov modeling. PPM models 
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Unknown bits with a known bit at the end 
777 . . . 7 
777 . . . 70 
Output 
1 0 0 . . . 0 0 
O i l . . .11 
Table 2.2: Example of output of unknown bits 
© © © © 
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Figure 2.13: Example of how to fix the unknown bit (2) 
can achieve a reasonably good performance but such models with higher order require 
larger amount of memory compared with other algorithms such as Ziv-Lempel. The 
performance of the lower order models is not as good as algorithms such as Ziv-Lempel 
and block-sorting. 
Chapter 3 
Arithmetic coding encryption schemes 
Arithmetic coding is an optimal compression algorithm. Compression provides efficient 
use of channel by reducing the redundancy of data. Compressing data before applying 
encryption improves security (Section 2.3). If arithmetic coding can be also made to 
provide security, less overall processing overhead can be expected. Arithmetic coding 
encryption schemes were proposed by Witten/Cleary [WC88]. Later several attacks on 
the proposed schemes were published. In this chapter, we describe arithmetic coding 
encryption schemes, briefly look at the effect of added security on the compression 
performance and give an assessment of security of the resulting systems. In Section 3.2 
and 3.3 we review three known attacks on model-based schemes. The first attack is 
against non-adaptive models and the other two are against adaptive systems. Section 
3.4 shows an attack on a coder-based scheme which uses binary alphabet and Section 
3.5 summarizes attacks and the problems of the schemes. 
3.1 Arithmetic coding encryption schemes 
Adaptive arithmetic coding encryption schemes were motivated by the following ob-
servations [WC88 . 
1. Models for data compression are often very large and may act as an enormous 
key. 
2. If an adaptive model is used, the key depends on the entire transmitted text and 
finding the key would require tracking the changes to the model by decoding the 
entire transmission since initialization. 
3. It is very difficult to regain synchronization if the models for compression and 
decompression are different. 
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The proposed arithmetic coding encryption schemes are symmetric encryption al-
gorithms. Depending on which part of the arithmetic encoder/decoder contributes to 
the key, the schemes are divided into two categories, that is, model-based schemes and 
coder-based schemes. Also there is a scheme which combines the two. We describe 
these schemes in the following sections. 
3.1.1 Model-based schemes 
In Witten et aVs proposal, the model is used as the encryption key: that is the details 
of the model are only known to the transmitter and the receiver. These schemes are 
called model-based. 
Model-based scheme 1 
The secret key of the scheme is the initial model. 
In the scheme, the initial model is transmitted through a secure channel and is 
shared by the transmitter and the receiver. The other parameters such as the initial 
range of the coder is public. The information about the type of the model, such as 
PPM and the order of the model, are public. The secret is the parameters such as the 
initial frequencies of symbols and the order of symbols in the frequency table. Witten 
and Cleary suggested an array of single-character frequencies in the range of 1-10. 
Model-based scheme 2 
The secret key of the scheme is an initial string. 
The initial model and range are public and the key is a secret string, shared by 
the transmitter and receiver, that is input to the system before the actual message is 
started. The initial string is sent through a secure channel proceeding the transmission 
of a message. The key string modifies the models and the ranges in both the encoder 
and the decoder to one which is unknown to the attacker. 
3.1.2 Coder-based schemes 
An alternative approach proposed by Irvine, Cleary and Rinsma-Melchert is coder-based 
scheme [ICRM95;. 
The secret key of the scheme is a bit string which is used to narrow the range. 
Based on the key bit sequence, either the high value h is decreased or the low value 
I is increased by the amount {h — l)£ where e: is a public parameter and 0 < e < 1. 
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The known parameter e can be a part of the key but it must be carefully chosen 
not to affect the compression performance. A variation of this scheme, proposed in 
LFB981, is described in detail in the next section. 
3.1.3 A combined scheme 
Liu/Farrell/Boyd proposed a system that combines the model-based and the coder-
based schemes [LFB98]. The secret key of the scheme consists of the following. 
1. The initial model. 
2. The initial range in the coder. The range should be larger than ^̂  ^ ^̂ . 
3. A 16 bit substitution that is used to substitute the first 16 bits of encoder's 
output. 
4. Two sets of shrinking factors (£ho,£io) s-^d (chijSiJ , each consisting of an upper 
and a lower shrinking factor. This is used to narrow the range after encoding of 
a symbol. The shrinking factors £hj and should satisfy £ho ^ £hi and eî  ^ 
and 0.9000 < Sh^ < 0.9999 and 0.0000 < £i. < 0.0999 where j G {0,1}. 
5. A 128 bit random sequence to control the two sets of shrinking factors. This is 
cyclically used. 
Model Coder 
Symbol • Freq table ••I rangri' 
c t b £ hO £10 £ h 1 £ii 
116-bit mask"] • 
Figure 3.1: LFB scheme 
The procedure to encode a symbol is as follows. 
Step 1 Encoding a symbol according to (2.17). 
Step 2 Output a bit sequence. The high and low values are modified as shown in 
Fig.2.7. 
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Step 3 Shrink the range. 
For a set of shrinking factors (eho,£io) and {sh^^eij, the new hi^i and are 
calculated as follows. 
h^i = + (3.1) 
j e {0 ,1} , and is chosen according to the 128 bit random sequence. 
Range ( hi , li ) (hi',li' ) (hi",li") {hul ,lui ) 
Procedure 
Interval of 
message 
Q e ^ Encode E S ^ Output ^ ^ Shrink f ^ ^ Q 
Figure 3.2: Procedure of LFB scheme 
Liu/Farrell/Boyd claimed that the scheme is resistant against Bergen/Hogan attack 
(3.3.1) and estimated the cost of attacking the system to be 2̂ ^ x 2̂ ° x 2̂ ® x 2̂ ® = 2^^ 
3.1.4 Initialization and reset of the encoder 
In all schemes, initialization of a system includes loading of the key and initialization 
of other parameters. In some cases, a system may need to be reset to provide better 
security. 
Initialization and reset should be clearly differentiated. An arithmetic coder encryp-
tion scheme has two kinds of parameters which must be set before start of a message. 
These are i) secret key parameters, for example model in a model-based scheme, and 
a) non-key public parameters such as coder range in model-based schemes. During 
initialization both groups of parameters are set to chosen values which form default 
values of the system. In system reset key parameters are always set back to default 
values; non-key ones may take their default values or have new values (publicly known). 
Reset may be automatically invoked by the encoder/decoder. The trigger may be an 
end of the message symbol/signal, ie. EOF, or may be when a message size reaches a 
certain size. 
3.1.5 Effect on data compression performance 
One of the important criteria for the performance of an arithmetic encoding encryption 
schemes is the effect of the added encryption on the data compression performance. 
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ie. the compression ratio which is the average number of bits per input symbol, and 
the speed which is the average time to process an input symbol. In either of the 
model-based schemes, the initial model or the initial string will be randomly chosen. 
Hence the given model for a message does not necessarily represent the statistics of 
symbols in the message. If an adaptive model is used, as data compression proceeds 
the initial model is overwritten by the statistics of the incoming message. Witten et 
al estimated that 1,000 symbols are enough for order-0 adaptive models to adjust the 
model to the input message. So if the length of a message is considerably longer than 
1,000, the impact of randomly chosen model or initial string on the data compression 
performance will be small. 
In the case of the coder-based schemes, the added encryption algorithm has con-
tinuous influence on the data compression. The drop of the compression ratio may be 
minimized by appropriate choice of e. However, the scheme will have reduced com-
pression speed because the extra-narrowing is equivalent to encoding a second symbol. 
For example, the combined scheme by Liu et al [LFB98] results in approximately 2% 
drop in the compression rate and almost doubles the processing time. 
Encryption schemes should be carefully designed so that the drop in the compression 
ratio and speed is minimized. Otherwise, arithmetic coding encryption schemes can be 
beaten by a conventional method of using compression and encryption as two separate 
subsystems, and there is no benefit in using arithmetic coding encryption schemes. 
3.1.6 Security of the schemes 
One simple method of evaluating security is the size of the key space. In model-based 
schemes, the key is the model and hence the size of the key space is the number of all 
possible states of the model. As an example, in case of model-based schemes with the 
order-0 model, assume that the number of symbols is N.ymboi and the initial frequency 
F{ip) for a symbol ip can be any number between 1 and F^ax ; that is 1 < F{ip) < F^ax-
Then the number of possible combinations is F^ax^'""'"''- If symbols are ordered, 
then there are N.ymboi = ŝymboî - possible orders of symbols. So the number 
of possible initial models (keys) is Fmax^'y^'"' • N,ymboi\- In the case of coder-based 
schemes, assuming that the size of the key sequence is 5, there are possible key 
values. If the exhaustive key search is used to attack a system, the figures given above 
show at most how many attempts are required. 
However, the numbers only give an upper bound as the security. If a different 
attack method is used, the difficulty of breaking a system will change. The security 
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strength is largely determined by the attack method used. Hence it is not an easy task 
to evaluate the security without investigating every possible attack method. 
3.2 Attack on non-adaptive arithmetic coding en-
cryption scheme 
BH [BH92] demonstrated an attack on non-adaptive model-based arithmetic coding en-
cryption scheme. They showed that each symbol corresponds to a fixed output pattern 
and so non-adaptive system is not suitable for encryption. Cleary/Irvine/Rinsma-
Melchert demonstrated a chosen plaintext attack on non-adaptive model-based en-
cryption using binary alphabet (input) to obtain the model. They showed that u + 2 
characters are sufficient to uniquely determine a u bit probability [CIRM95]. This 
target system is much simpler than 8-bit alphabet system. 
3.3 Attacks on adaptive schemes 
3.3.1 Bergen/Hogan attack 
BH attack on adaptive schemes is a chosen plaintext attack where the attacker can 
feed plaintexts of her/his choice to the encoder. The attack does not discover the key 
(initial model) but succeeds to modify the model into a form which is known to the 
attacker, hence allowing the attacker to decrypt the communication afterwards. 
For the attack to work, the following assumptions are used : 
• The system is a model-based scheme of first or second type. That is, the key is 
either initial model or the initial string. The initial state of the encoder does not 
affect the attack. 
• The system uses order-0 adaptive arithmetic coding. The attack is based on 
WNC implementation . 
• The attacker is able to send symbols to the encoder and obtain the output. 
• The attacker has a decoder. 
This attack uses two properties of the WNC implementation : halving of symbols' 
frequencies when the F(V'max) = î max, and imposed ordering on the frequency table. 
The attack consists of two steps. 
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Step 1 The attacker sends a long enough string of a single symbol, to cause halving. 
If the string is chosen long enough, with enough number of halvings occurring, 
ip eventually moves to the top of the table and frequencies of all other symbols 
become 1. If more V' are sent so that another halving occurs, the frequency of 
V'max will become a constant, given by 
-̂ max ^symbols 1 
= L (3.2) 
where N ŷ̂ ôU is the number of symbols. We refer to this state of the model as 
synchronized state. We note that once the model is synchronized the number of 
ip required to produce another halving, denoted by n, becomes a constant 
^max. {^aymbola l) ^ — -̂ max {^symbola l) 
At this stage the attacker does not know the order of symbols. 
(3.3) 
Step 2 He/She sends other symbols one by one, each time moving the sent symbol 
above other symbols, the frequencies of which are 1, and hence effectively re-
ordering symbols in the frequency table. 
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Figure 3.3: Example of BH attack 
However the re-ordering will fail if halving occurs during this step. To guarantee 
the successful re-ordering, it is necessary for already re-ordered symbols not to move. 
This condition is satisfied when the frequencies of already re-ordered symbols are 2. 
After the synchronization of the model (Step 1), the frequency of each symbol except 
the one at the top of the table becomes 1. By sending symbols to re-order (Step 2), 
their frequencies become 2. If halving occurs, all those frequencies will become 1 and 
hence those symbols in the table may move when a symbol is sent. 
Now the model can be verified by decoding a message. We note that for correct 
decoding the attacker must know the range of the coder at this stage. This is an 
assumed knowledge in BH attack. 
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To protect against this attack, BH proposed regular changing of Fmax- Transmitter 
and receiver use a shared pseudo random sequence to generate consecutive values of 
-̂ max- Since halving occurs when the F(V'max) = •f'max the halving points become 
unpredictable. This randomization in general reduces the compression rate (although 
in special cases compression rate might be improved). Lim/Boyd/Dawson suggest 
regular resetting of the model during encoding a message [LBD97] which effectively 
discards a model modified by an attacker. However, as shown by their experiment, 
more frequent reset results in reduced compression rate and this reduction is higher for 
higher order models. 
The attack uses the properties of the adaptive model. Hence any adaptive model 
has a possibility of the attack although how easy to control the model by a message 
sent will vary with the type of the model. A model of quick adaptation to an input 
message can also be quick to be taken control. Obviously the adaptation speed affects 
the compression so the protection against the attack by slowing down the adaptation 
will also drop the compression. As can be seen from the attack, an order-0 model can 
be easily controlled by the attack. However a model of the higher order such as PPM 
can be attacked by the method but whether or not it is practical in terms of the cost 
of the attack is unknown. 
3.3.2 Lim/Boyd/Dawson attack 
As noted earlier, BH attack does not find the key. Lim et al showed a chosen plaintext 
attack that discovers the key. For the attack to work, the following assumptions are 
used. 
• The system is a model-based scheme of type 1. The initial frequencies of symbols 
are unknown. The order of symbols in the symbol table and the initial range are 
known. 
• The system can be an adaptive arithmetic coding of any order. 
• The attacker can send symbols to the encoder and obtain the output. 
• The attacker can reset the system, that is, after sending a string through the 
coder, it can return to the starting state. 
The attacker first tries to find out the frequency of the symbol at the bottom of the 
table, F(V'min)j a-nd the total cumulative frequency C/i(V'max)- For this purpose, s/he 
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sends Vmin to the encoder and then terminates the message to obtain the output. Using 
exhaustive search, possible combinations of F(ifi^n) and C/,(V'max) which produce the 
same output are obtained. The rest of the symbols are attacked in a similar way. As 
the attack proceeds, the number of possibilities for a symbol frequency, assuming all 
the previous frequencies and ChO^m^) are known, reduces and so although exhaustive 
search is used, it is more efficient than the naive exhaustive search. 
To protect against the attack, Lim et al proposed regular reset with different non-
key default values, or full initialization each time. These are the same protection 
measures used against BH attack. 
3.4 Attack on coder-based scheme 
Irvine, Cleary and Rinsma-Melchert [ICRM95] described an attack on the coder-based 
scheme. The analysis is based on a static arithmetic coding using an alphabet of size 
two. An encoding result can be represented by a polynomial in symbol probability 
of symbols, a constant e and the key bits, which are the unknown. It is showed that 
the security can be reduced to a subset sum problem. Irvine et al concluded that the 
security must come from the model rather than the arithmetic coder. 
3.5 Conclusion 
Arithmetic coding encryption schemes are to provide security using arithmetic data 
compression systems by hiding the internal information required to decompress en-
coder's output. If this can be achieved without adding costly algorithms, better effi-
ciency is expected. The information, which is kept secret, ie. the key of the encryption 
system, can be the parameters in the model or the coder. The schemes are categorized 
into model-based, coder-based and their combined schemes. In model-based schemes, 
the drop in compression performance can be minimized using the advantage of adaptive 
models. Coder-based schemes have the disadvantage of drop in the processing speed. 
In both cases the security of the system cannot be simply evaluated based on the size 
of the key space. 
There are several attacks which use different properties of arithmetic coding. BH 
attack on adaptive system uses the adaptive property of the model. The attack by Lim 
et al uses the public knowledge about the model. It is known that the frequency of a 
symbol takes a value within a certain range and how it is updated. In the attack on 
3.5. Conclusion 31 
coder-based schemes, encoder's output is used to solve a polynomial and determines 
the key bits. 
In the following chapter, we demonstrate new attacks on the schemes. 
Chapter 4 
New Attacks 
Previously known attacks showed that the properties of arithmetic coding can be ex-
ploited to break the system. In this chapter we demonstrate new attacks on arithmetic 
coding encryption schemes and show various new ways of exploiting these properties 
for attacking the system. 
In Section 4.1, new attacks which strengthen the BH attack on the model-based 
schemes are described. There are two weak points in the BH attack : i) if halving 
occurs during the re-ordering procedure, re-ordering fails and ii) the BH attack can 
not find the coder's secrets, ie. the high and low values. In Section 4.1 we show how 
to detect halving and then describe the methods of finding the high and low values. 
In Section 4.2 we demonstrate an attack against the combined-scheme which is an 
extended BH attack. Finally we summarize the attacks and the properties used in 
them. 
4.1 Strengthening BH attack 
The major weakness of the BH attack is the re-ordering procedure and that after over-
flooding, the model is only roughly known and it is necessary to verify the state of the 
model by decoding the output of the encoder. To correctly decode encoder's output, it 
is necessary to know the order of symbols in the frequency table and the high and low 
values in the coder. If halving of frequencies occurs during the re-ordering procedure, 
re-ordering fails and it must be performed again. If the attacker can determine the halv-
ing point, then this problem can be avoided by doing re-ordering right after the halving. 
Since the halving period is approximately 8000 symbols and re-ordering requires only 
255 symbols, re-ordering right after halving guarantees successful re-ordering. After 
the successful re-ordering, there are several methods either to investigate the high and 
low values from encoder's output, or to force the high and low values to take certain 
values. 
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In the following, we show two methods of finding halving points by observing en-
coder's output. Then we demonstrate several attacks on the system that allow the 
range of the coder to be estimated. 
4.1.1 Detection of the halving point 
The first method, which can detect the exact halving point, uses repeated experiments 
on the output and hence is more expensive. It can be avoided by initializing the 
system before each message. The second one, uses the size of output per symbol to find 
-P'(V'max), resulting in the number of possible values to be reduced from to 2®. This is 
because after synchronization of the model, satisfies 8064 < < 16383 
and hence, there are 8320 2̂ ^ possible values for F(V'niax)- BH attack blindly tries to 
decode using all possible values one at a time. Using our proposed attack the number 
of possible values can be reduced to 2®. 
The relationship between halvings and the size of the encoder's output 
The length of the encoder's output will give some information about halvings. Let 
a symbol ip be sent to synchronize the model. Prom (2.17), let i, given by i = 
^̂  denote the frequency right after a halving after the syn-
chronization of the model, and given by /^^x = - N.ymboi - t, denote the 
frequency F(V'max) just before a halving. Notice that because J = i, /^ax is 
equal to either i or i — 1. This means that every other symbol has a frequency of 1. 
Now assume we keep sending the symbol ip. In this case F(i/'niax) will consecutively 
take the values from t to /max and the probability of will consecutively take the 
values 
t ¿4-2 t 4- /max 
t - f N a y m b o l — 1 ' i - f N s y m b o l — 1 + 1 ' i + N a y m b o l " 1 + 2 ' ^ t + N s y m b o l " 1 + / m a x 
. This can be written as 
t + ^ s y m b o l - 1 + i 
where 0 < i < /max- Just before halving, i = /max- When halving occurs at this stage 
the probability changes from P f ^ , ^ = to Po(^) = ¡iTfl^^pr- The 
change in the size of the output is to log2Po{ip). The graph 4.1 shows the 
change with different values of t when N ^ y m b o i = 256. 
As the graph shows, a halving almost doubles the output rate (bits/symbol) re-
gardless of the value of t. The change will result in a noticeable change in the encoder 
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Figure 4.1: Change in the output size for Nsymbol ==256 
output in terms of values and size. We give two methods of using this information to 
obtain a good estimate of the halving point. 
(1) Using repeated experiments on the output 
The change can be observed as the change in the narrowing down of the interval. 
Between two halving points, the change in the probability of the symbol that is used 
to over-flood the model, compared to the change caused by the halving, is relatively 
small. The probability is directly reflected in how much the interval is narrowed down. 
Hence by observing the change in the rate of the narrowing of the interval, it is possible 
to detect the halving point. 
Assume that the model is synchronized and t is as defined in the previous section. 
Let Ij and h j denote the low value and high values, respectively, and Vj denote the 
range given by Vj = h j - and the probability of symbol i/̂ max is Fj(V^max)- After 
the synchronization, when the symbol V'max is encoded, h'- = Ij + = 
h j and hence the high value does not change and takes the value OxFFFF. At the 
point right before halving, j = /^ax - 1 and the probability of ip is (V'max) = 
i+iVjy^fcoi —H-/max —1 ' 
In the following, we calculate the low value and the range just before the halving 
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int, after the halving point and then at two more consecutive points. Then we look 
the behavior of ^^^ j e {1 ,2 ,3} , and show how to have a good estimate for the 
Iviner Doint. 
(4.2) 
po  
at  
halving point. 
Just before the halving point, we have 
1 J , ^symbol ^ ¿1 z= Iq ^Q 
t H" ^symbol 1 + /max 
n = h^-h=ho-lo-ro ~ ^ =:ro tUll^ 
i + ^symbol - 1 + /max t + Â aymfcoi " 1 + /max 
A/i = li-lo 
^ ^symbol 1 
i + ^symbol - 1 + /max 
Similarly, 
t -r symbol — ^ 
r2 = h2 — ¡2 = hi — li — Ti— ].— _ ^ ^ i 
t + Naymbol — 1 i + ^symbol " 1 
Ah = /2 - = f ~ \ 
t + ^^ symbol — J-
^ {^symbol - m + fm^) 
' [t + Naymbol - 1 + /max)(i + Nsymbol " 1 ) ^ ' ^ 
h = l2+r2 ~ ^ 
1 1 1 1 ŝymbol 1- i H" 1 
t + symbol — i H- i C + lysymbol " 1 + 1 
Ah = h-l2 = r2 ~ ^ 
' ' 't+Naymbol- 1+1 
= r, {^symbol - 1)^ 
{t + Nayrr^bol - l ) ( i + Nayr^bol - 1 + 1) ^ ' ^ 
/ _ / ^ ^symbol — 1 
1 1 1 1 Naymbol — 1 _ ^ + 2 
n = = ^^^^^ _ 1 + 2 - i + - 1 + 2 
t + ly symbol - 1 + ^ 
^ W y m f e o / - l ) ( ^ + l ) 
' {t + Naymbol - 1 + l ) ( i + Naymbol " 1 + 2) 
From (4.2) and (4.3), the ratio of Ali and AI2 is 
A 7 ^ (̂ »vmbot-i)(t+2) 
f ^ _ ° {t+N,ymbol-l+fm^^){t+Nsymbol-i) 
All N,ymbol-l 
/max 
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t + /max 2t 
t + N.ymbol - 1 i -h - 1 
(4.6) 
IS 
The last approximation step is true because /^ax is equal to, or very close to t. 
Similarly, from (4.3) and (4.4), and from (4.4) and (4.5), the ratio of A k and A/3 
A/ ri7 i^sym(,ol-l)t _ ^̂  {t + N,ymb0l-l){t + N,ymb0l-l+l) 
AI2 r, ^*ymboi-l 
t 
t + Nsymbcl - 1 + 1 (t + Nsymbol - 1) 
AU N,ymbol-l 
t + l . t 
(4.7) 
(4.8) 
t + Symbol - 1 + 2 (i + N.ymbol - 1) 
Approximation steps are true because t is large. 
Comparing (4.6) with (4.7) and (4.8), we note that the ratio is almost doubled 
right after the halving point and stayed nearly constant afterwards, (compare (4.7) 
with (4.8)). This difference can be used to detect the halving point. 
The outline of the attack is as follows: 
Step 1 Send a long enough sequence of a single character, ip̂  to synchronize the model. 
Finish encoding and obtain encoder's output, Oj where j = 1. Increment j . 
Step 2 Repeat the following step at most /max times. 
Send a message 1 character longer than the previous one, using ip. Finish encod-
ing and obtain encoder's output, Oj. Calculate A o j = Oj — O j _ i . Increment i. 
Observe the sequence Oj. Between two halving points, Aoj gradually decreases 
but it is doubled just after the halving point. 
An example for step 2 calculations, that is Aoj = Oj — is as follows. 
0110100 . . . 11011010100 {oj) 
- 0110100 . . . 11001101000 (oj_i) 
0000000 . . . 00001101100 {Aoj) 
Change in Aoi at the halving point could be as recorded in Table 4.1. 
This method relies on accurate output values and so it is necessary to finish encoding 
for each sequence of symbols. Although this method enables accurate detection of the 
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Aoj 
5128 
5048 
4972 Halving point 
9624 
9328 
Table 4.1: Example of Aoj values 
halving point, it is expensive and can be easily avoided by using different non-key 
values or initializing the system for each message. 
(2) Non-repeated analysis of the output 
Since there is a noticeable change in the probability before and after a halving, it is 
possible to detect the halving point by observing how many bits are produced when a 
symbol is encoded. The advantage of this method is that it does not require repeated 
experiments. In the implementation that are considered, t = 8064, N^y^boi = 256 
and /max = 8063, and so the number of required bits for a symbol changes from 
= -log,0.9692 = 0.045 to - W 2 ^o^+tteTsoss = -^"520.9844 = 0.023. 
In practice, the number of bits per symbol will not precisely follow these exact 
values. The reasons for this are ij mid-range buffering ii) the output is always an 
integral number of bits while a symbol might need a fractional number of bits. The 
fractional part is passed to the next symbol and is added to the bits required by the next 
symbol. Also if the probability of a symbol P(TP} is large and hence, —log2P{ip) < < 1, 
encoding the symbol may not produce any output. From above discussion, it is not 
possible to detect the halving point by observing the encoding result of a single symbol. 
However it is possible to detect it if the average output size per symbol is considered, 
although some accuracy will be lost. 
Figure 4.2: Example of average output size of 128 symbols 
A rough estimation for the halving point can be obtained if the average bit per 
symbol is calculated for each m input symbols. In the WNC implementation , the 
output is byte-buffered and hence, there is an output only when the buffer is filled. 
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Although this makes the analysis less accurate due to the delay in the output, it is still 
possible to roughly detect the halving points. In Table 4.2 and 4.3, we give an example 
of the calculation when m = 128. The block in which the halving occurs is marked 
with *. 
*0.023438 0.031250 0.031250 *0.023438 0.031250 0.031250 *0.023438 
0.046875 0.031250 0.023438 0.046875 0.031250 0.023438 0.046875 
0.046875 0.039062 0.023438 0.046875 0.039062 0.023438 0.046875 
0.039062 0.031250 0.031250 0.039062 0.031250 0.031250 0.039062 
0.046875 0.031250 0.023438 0.046875 0.031250 0.023438 0.046875 
0.039062 0.031250 0.031250 0.039062 0.031250 0.031250 0.039062 
0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 0.039062 
0.046875 0.031250 0.023438 0.046875 0.031250 0.023438 0.046875 
0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 . 
0.039062 0.031250 0.031250 0.039062 0.031250 0.031250 . 
0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 . 
0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 
0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 
0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 
0.023438 0.031250 0.023438 0.023438 0.031250 0.023438 0.023438 
0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 
0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 
0.031250 0.031250 0.023438 0.023438 0.031250 0.023438 0.023438 
0.015625 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 0.039062 0.031250 0.023438 
0.023438 0.031250 0.031250 0.023438 0.031250 0.031250 0.023438 
0.023438 0.039062 0.023438 0.023438 0.039062 0.023438 0.023438 
Table 4.2: Average bits/symbol of 128 symbol block : bit-oriented output 
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*0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 *0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 *0.062500 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 
0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 
0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 
0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 
0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 
0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 
0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 
0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 0.000000 
0.000000 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 
0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 
0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 
0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 
0.062500 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 0.000000 
0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 0.000000 0.062500 
0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 0.000000 
0.000000 0.000000 0.000000 0.062500 0.062500 0.000000 0.000000 
Table 4.3: Average bits/symbol of 128 symbol block : byte-buffered output 
It can be seen that it is possible to find one or two blocks which are likely to 
include the halving point. The result of the same test performed on byte-oriented 
output implementation, ie. original WNC implementation , is given in Table 4.3. The 
number of bits per symbol is either 0 or yfg = 0.0625, and so there is either no output 
or one byte output per 128 symbols. 
In this latter case detection of halving is less accurate but if the rate of producing 
output bytes is carefully monitored, it will be possible to detect the halving point in a 
way similar to bit-oriented output since there will be a sudden increase in the output 
rate. 
4.1.2 Attacks on the coder 
It is necessary for an attacker to know the range of the coder to decrypt the message. 
We give three attacks on the coder. The first attack uses attacker's encoder to discover 
the range and the cost is This is the cost of finding the high value. The second 
one only discovers the low value of the range but can reduce the number of possible 
values to 7. The last attack forces the range of the coder to take one of the two possible 
values. 
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The range of the coder changes as encoding proceeds and its value depends on the 
encoded symbols' cumulative frequencies. Without the coder range, it is impossible to 
decode a message even if the model is known. The encoder's output leaks information 
about the model and the range, and the amount of information depends on the input 
string and the state of the model. 
Our proposed attacks on the coder use the following properties of the coder. 
Property 1 If the same plaintext is encoded using two encoders which have the same 
values for ho—lo and identical model, but have different values for /q, the difference 
of the two output strings is equal to the difference between the two low values, 
which will consists of 16 bits (because 16 bit integer arithmetic is used) followed 
by zeros. 
Property 2 If the cumulative probability of ^min is small, encoding the symbol pro-
duces a considerable length output which is very close to the low value used to 
encode the symbol. 
Property 3 If n bits are output, the least significant n bits of the high and low values 
become known because they are filled with Is and Os for the high and low values, 
respectively. If n is large, the number of unknown bits becomes small. 
Property 4 If symbols with very small probabilities are continuously encoded, the 
high and low pair has two possible values and in each case once the high and low 
pair takes that value, it will stays at that value. (Table 4.6, Table 4.7, Table 4.8) 
In the rest of this section, we describe several methods to find the range of the coder 
when the model is known. Firstly we describe the attack using property 1. Then we 
give two more attacks based on properties 2, and 3 together with 4. The latter attack 
is particularly interesting as it produces only two alternatives for the range and hence 
effectively allows the attacker to discover the range. 
(1) Attack on the coder using properties of encoder's output 
This attack uses Property 1 above. The assumptions are as follows. 
• The attack is a chosen plaintext attack. 
• The key is the initial range. 
• The model is known. 
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• The attacker has her/his own encoder and is able to initialize it. 
Notice that the assumption that the model is known above is almost satisfied after 
the synchronization of BH attack except for the frequency F(V'nxax). The method is as 
follows. 
Step 1 Encode a text and obtain the output o^. The text should be chosen to produce 
an output considerably longer than 16 bits. 
Step 2 To find range, set the low value to 0 and find possible high values. • The 
most significant bit of hi and li should be different and it should not satisfy the 
condition for mid-range buffering so h i - l i > 0x8000. The high value starts from 
0x8000. Encoding the same text used in step 1 gives the output 02. Calculate 
Oi - 02. 
Since the offset of the correct range from the experimental one is 16 bits (d in 
Fig.4.3), the most significant 16 bits of Oj - 02, denoted by [oj - 02]m, represents 
the low value. The subsequent least significant bits of 01-02, denoted by [01-02]^, 
must be 0 if /iq ~ is correctly evaluated. However due to various inaccuracies 
of integer arithmetic [oi — 02]^ may not be 0 but will be a value very close to 0. 
Step 3 Increment the high value by 1 and repeat the above Step 2 until [oi — 02 
becomes 0 or very close to 0. 
Figure 4.3: Relation between the difference of range and output 
If such a range is found, even if it is not the correct one, it can be used to correctly 
decode the message. Let u be [ i ^ r i ^ M j then < {hi - li)F{il)') < {u + 
l)F{iprnax)- ^(V'max) is constant and for a given F{ip') and u^ there are many possible 
hi and k that satisfy the condition. Since the calculation of the new range only depends 
on the previous range, once the range takes the correct value the sequence of symbols 
that follow can be correctly decoded. The number of the valid ranges depends on the 
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frequency of the symbol and the range, and in general, is not one. The cost of the 
attack on WNC implementation is at most This is because we only search for the 
high value and the low value is fixed to 0. The high value is 16 bits and its MSB will 
be 1 and so the number of the possible values for the high value is 
(2) Finding the low value from output 
The following attack is based on Property 2. Assume that the mid-range buffering 
does not occur. When a symbol at the bottom of the frequency table is encoded, the 
high and low values are updated as (2.17) and ^ ^ < < because 
' i'KWmax) — r[y}max) ^ (Vmax) ^ 
hi - l i is between 0x8000 and OxFFFF. If F(V'max) is around 16000, then 1 < < 5. 
Assuming that encoding the symbol ip produces u bits of output, then m<l\<M 
where M is a 16 bit value having the u MSB equal to the u MSB of and the rest 
equal to 1, while m is the same as M with 16 - u LSB equal to 0. 
liu = 14, then M—m = 3 because M = * * * * * * * * * * * * * * i i and m = * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 0 0 
and m < < m + 3. Because = h + L i ^ g ^ J we have h = l[ - and so 
m — A < li < m -hS. Hence there are only 7 possible values for which can be derived 
from the output as shown above. 
(3) Discovering the range 
This part describes how Property 3 and Property 4 can discover the range. Assume 
the model to be synchronized, using the symbol 0x00 for over-flooding and the symbols 
are in ascending order in the table, ie. 0x00, 0x01, ... OxFF. The procedure is as follows. 
1. After over-flooding and re-ordering, frequencies of all symbols except the one 
used for halving are 2. 
Then, cause another halving to make the frequency of each symbol equal to 1. 
Send a message consisting of the symbol used to synchronize the model to make 
Chi'̂ ma.x) close to the upper limit Cmax-
2. Use the following procedure to generate a long output : 
i) Input symbol OxFF at the bottom of the frequency table. The symbol goes to 
the second place in the table and the second symbol 0x01 moves to the bottom. 
ii) Input symbol 0x01. The symbol goes to the third place in the frequency table 
and the third symbol 0x02 is shifted to the bottom. 
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in) Input symbol 0x02. The symbol goes to the fourth place in the frequency 
table and the fourth symbol 0x03 moves to the bottom. 
iv) Repeat as above for all symbols up to OxFE. This will give an attacker a long 
enough output. 
3. Try to decode the output using one of the ranges below and verify the decoding 
result. 
( a ) (0x0000,OxFFFF) 
( b ) (0x4000,OxFFFF) 
The reason that Step 3 above works is the following. If the last symbol in the table 
is encoded, the output size would be ~ 12 bits when the total frequency is 
close to 8000, and would be -log2j^ ^ 14 bits when the total is around 16000. If 
14 bits are output, each high and low value is left-shifted by 14 bits and the lower 14 
bits are filled by 1 for the high value and by 0 for the low value. The only unknown 
is the first 2 bits. There are 4 possible combinations : that is, {l,h) = {(00, 10), 
(00, 11), (01, 10), (01, 11)}. However, (01, 10) will cause the mid-range buffering, 
resulting in (0x0000,OxFFFF), and so there are only three possibilities for the range of 
the next symbol. That is, (OxOOOO,OxBFFF), (0x0000,OxFFFF) and (0x4000,0xFFFF). 
If the range is (0x0000,OxBFFF), the new range is calculated from (2.17) as given in 
Table 4.6. Hence the range (0x0000,OxBFFF) changes into (0x4000,OxFFFF). Similarly, 
the ranges (0x0000,OxFFFF) and (0x4000,OxFFFF) can be calculated as given in Table 
4.7 and Table 4.8. Since both of these give the same values, there are only 2 possible 
ranges. Once the range drops into one of them, the same output pattern is repeated. 
That is, the range (0x0000,OxFFFF) repeats output pattern 00000000000001 and the 
range (0x4000,OxFFFF) repeats output pattern 01100000000000. 
A 14 bit output results in 2 possible ranges and a 12 bit output will result in 48 
possible ranges and hence the number of possible ranges is greatly reduced. 
Assume that the output size is n, then the number of the unknown bits of hi and is 
216-u jjence after the output, the MSB of hi and h must be different and so are 
unknown. Now we have x possible hi and k pairs but some may satisfy 
the condition of the mid-range buffering and if so, hi and li are left-shifted and LSB 
of hi and k are filled by 1 and 0, respectively. As a result of the mid-range buffering, 
new hi and U will be equal to those of the other pairs and the above procedure will be 
repeated until hi and does not satisfy the condition of the mid-range buffering. 
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We define group 1 as hi and k which does not satisfy the condition of the mid-
range buffering and group 1 < ^ < 4, is defined as (h i j i ) pairs which satisfy the 
condition of the mid-range buffering and result in the values found in group g - 1 
after the mid-range buffering occurs. The high/low values in group 1 is outside of 
the mid-range (0x4000 to OxBFFF). If either of the high or low value belongs to this 
group, no mid-range buffering occurs. The high or low values in group 2 may cause 
the mid-range buffering but at most once, ie. 1 bit in the mid-range buffer. As a 
result of the mid-range buffering, the value changes into one of the values in group 1. 
Similarly, the high/low values in group 3 may cause the mid-range buffering at most 
twice and after the mid-range buffering, the values change into the values in group 2. 
For the values in group 4, at most three bits may go to the mid-range buffer and so 
on. 
Group Low values High values 
1 0x0000,0x1000,0x2000,0x3000 OxCFFF,OxDFFF,OxEFFF,OxFFFF 
2 0x4000,0x5000 OxAFFF,OxBFFF 
3 0x6000 0x9FFF 
4 0x7000 0x8FFF 
Table 4.4: Groups of ranges with 12 bit output 
For a hi and pair, the one which has the lower number group determines how 
many times the mid-range buffing occurs. The following tables shows the movement 
of the higher number groups to the lower number groups. 
Group 4 Group 3 Group 2 Group 1 
0x7000 0x6000 0x4000 0x0000 
0x1000 
0x5000 0x2000 
0x3000 
OxCFFF 
OxAFFF OxDFFF 
OxEFFF 
OxSFFF 0x9FFF OxBFFF OxFFFF 
Table 4.5: Changing ranges of mid-range buffering with 12 bit output 
Cost of attack 
In the WNC implementation , halving occurs when the total frequency reaches Cmax-
At the beginning of the attack, frequencies are not known. For a the value F(ip) 
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Low value High valué 
Initial value 0000 0000 0000 0000 1011 1111 1111 1111 
After encoding 0000 0000 0000 0011 0000 0000 0000 0101 
After output 0110 0000 0000 0000 1011 1111 1111 1111 
Mid range buff. 0010 0000 0000 0000 0111 1111 1111 1111 
Final value 0100 0000 0000 0000 1111 1111 1111 1111 
Table 4.6: The change of the range (0x0000,0xBFFF) with 14 
Low value High value 
Initial value 0000 0000 0000 0000 1111 1111 1111 n i l 
After encoding 0000 0000 0000 0100 0000 0000 0000 0111 
After output 0000 0000 0000 0000 n i l n i l n i l n n 
Table 4.7: The change of the range (0x0000,OxFFFF) with 14 bit output 
satisfies 1 < F(iP) < C^^ - N^y^boi - 1 ; ie. 1 < F{'il)) < 16127. To synchronize the 
model, all F{il)) except F(V'niax) should be reduced to 1. Assuming that the attacker is 
going to synchronize the model using symbol tp, and the frequency of another symbol 
ip' is F(7p') = 16127 (and so all other frequencies are 1), log2l6127 14 halvings are 
required to reduce F{ip') to 1. Hence, after at most 14 halvings any frequency can be 
reduced to 1. 
In the above case, after the first halving, becomes L^^^^^^J = = 
8064 and F(V''max) = 8064 + N.ymboi - 1 + 1 = 8064 -h 256 + 1 = 8321. To cause 
another halving, 16383 - 8321 + 1 = 8063 symbols must be sent. So in general, to 
synchronize the model, at most a message of length 14 x 8063 = 112882 of symbols 
is required. After synchronization, 255 symbols for re-ordering and approximately 
8000 symbols for another halving should be sent. To attack the coder, the small 
probability of symbols are required. If the symbol at the bottom of the table is chosen, 
the probability is Chi-̂ m̂ x) ^^^ when C/i('0max) is close to its maximum value, the 
probability becomes close to the minimum and the output rate of 14 bits/symbol is 
achieved. Another 8000 symbols will achieve this. Hence, the total number of required 
symbols is 112882 + 255 + 8000 + 8000 130000. F(V'max) is unknown and there are 
2® possible values for F(V'max) and the range of the coder will be one of the two values. 
The pattern of the bit sequence of encoder's output is known and so the relationship 
between a symbol and its encoded output is clear. 
Notice that the attack on the coder to discover the range can be used on coder-
based scheme in general. If the two consecutive ranges are known, the key information 
that is used to narrow the range can be obtained. 
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Low value High valué 
Initial value 0100 0000 0000 0000 1111 1111 1111 1111 
After encoding 0100 0000 0000 0011 0100 0000 0000 0101 
After output 0110 0000 0000 0000 1011 1111 1111 1111 
Mid range buff. 0010 0000 0000 0000 0111 1111 1111 1111 
Final value 0100 0000 0000 0000 1111 1111 1111 1111 
Table 4.8: The change of the range (0x4000,OxFFFF) with 14 bit output 
4.2 Attack on a combined scheme 
The two schemes, ie. the model-based and the coder-based schemes, can be combined 
together. An example of the combined scheme is Liu/Farrell/Boyd scheme 3.1.3. The 
system can be attacked using a method similar to the attack on the model-based 
system. The model can be modified into a known form by BH attack and the secret in 
the coder can be discovered by the attacks described in the previous sections. 
In this section we describe the attack on the Liu/Farrell/Boyd scheme as an example 
of the combined scheme. The attack has two steps and can reduce the key space to 
In the first step the attacker uses BH attack to take control over the model by 
sending a chosen message and finding an approximate value for the halving point, and 
in the second step he uses a method of discovering the shrinking factors by encoding 
symbols of small frequencies. 
4.2.1 Outline of the attack 
The relationship between an input symbol, the model and the coder is ij the model 
is modified according to an input symbol and iij the coder encodes a symbol, which 
is represented by two consecutive cumulative frequencies given by the model. Once 
the model is known, the coder can be controlled using the knowledge of the model. 
BH attack modifies the model into a known form. The weakness of BH attack is 
that if halving occurs during the re-ordering procedure, the attack fails. The attack 
strengthens BH attack using the method which enables detecting of the halving point. 
The secret parameters of the coder, /i» and li, can be controlled by encoding symbols 
of small frequencies. This is possible if the model is known. From (2.18), when output 
size is u bits, the number of unknown bits after output is 16 — li because the least 
significant u bits are filled with the known values. If u is large, the number of the 
unknown bits becomes small. The maximum of u is given by 
16383 
14 (4.9) 
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and hence, the unknown bits of hi and li are reduced to 2. Using the knowledge of the 
model it is possible to selectively encode symbols of small frequencies. Furthermore, it 
is known that Ch{iprnax) is maximized right before halving. 
The assumptions are as follows. 
1. The scheme is Liu/Farrell/Boyd scheme. 
2. The implementation is based on Neal/Witten/Cleary implementation. The out-
put is byte-buffered, ie. 8 bit blocks are output. We do not consider any I/O 
buffering of stdio , which may be used by the operating system since the scheme 
does not explicitly take into account the blocking and the buffering as part of the 
system. The effect of the blocking on the attack is discussed in Section 4.2.4. 
3. The attack is a chosen plaintext attack. The attacker has access to the encoder 
and can see the output. The attack does not require any reset of the system. 
The steps of the attack are 
Step 1 i) Over-flood the model by sending a long enough message consisting of single 
symbol ip and observe the change of the output length per symbol. Obtain a 
rough estimate of the halving point. Details of how to detect the halving point 
is described in Section 4.1.1. 
ii) Re-order the symbols in the frequency table. At this stage, the model becomes 
known to the attacker. That is, the frequencies of all the symbols except ip at 
the top of the table becomes 2. 
Step 2 i) Send a message consisting of the symbol again to cause a halving and 
to make Chii^) close to Cmax? ie. 16383. After this, the frequencies of all the 
symbols except at the top of the table become 1 again. 
ii) Repeatedly send the symbols '0min at the bottom of the frequency table and 
obtain the output. There are 255 symbols with frequency 1. Encoding these 
symbols produces a considerably long output. Details are given in Section 4.2.3. 
Hi) Identify the output bit sequence for each of the 255 symbols by analyzing the 
bit patterns. Details are given in Section 4.2.4. 
iv) Calculate the lower shrinking factors from the bit sequence. Details are given 
in Section 4.2.3. 
v) Find the 128 bit random sequence using the lower shrinking factors found. 
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In the following, we describe how to detect the halving point and analyze the 
security that the shrinking factors provide, followed by a method to find the shrinking 
factors and the random bit sequence. 
4.2.2 Security of the shrinking factors 
This section analyzes the security that is provided by the shrinking mechanism in the 
coder and describes a method to find the shrinking factors. 
Assumptions are as follows. 
1. The model is known. This means observation is done after synchronization of 
the model. 
2. Ck(ip^^x) is close to ¿6. 16383. 
3. The frequencies of the symbols other than the one at the top of the table are 1. 
4. The first bit of output bit sequence as a result of encoding a symbol is known. 
5. There is no mid-range buffering. 
When a symbol with a probability close to is encoded, if there is no shrink-
ing, the output length is approximately 14 bits. This follows from (4.9). The extra-
narrowing shrinks the range by at most approximately 80% and so the output length 
will be " ^ 2 0 . 8 ^ ^ 14.3 bits. This affects the required number of bits for a sym-
bol. For example, right before halving and without shrinking, the required number 
of bits for tpmax is 0.9844. If it is shrinked by 80%, the required length is 
(0.9844 X 0.8) = 0.3446 bits. In fact, extra-narrowing gives two possible ranges 
for each symbol, one of which will be selected depending on the pseudo-random bit. Al-
though for a single character, the extra-narrowing can disturb detection of the halving 
point but if the average length over blocks of 128 characters is calculated, the variation 
in the range can be averaged and the halving point can be detected. 
From (2.18), if the output size is 14 bits, the high and low values are h'! = 
** 11111111111111 and I'l = **00000000000000 respectively. From the conditions 
for the output in Section 2.5, i) h" and I" do not have any common most significant bit 
and a) the interval defined by h" and l" does not satisfy 0x4000 < interval < OxCOOO. 
There are three pairs of h" and I" which satisfy these conditions; possible pairs are, 
(OxFFFF, 0x4000), (OxFFFF, 0x0000) and (OxBFFF, 0x0000). 
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h'- and I'/ are narrowed down by either of the two sets of shrinking factors according 
to the 128 bit random sequence. Hence, there are six possible ranges in Step 1 of 
Section 3.1.3. Each of the six ranges becomes one of the three possible ranges after the 
output procedure in Step 2 in Section 3.1.3. 
Procadure Enccxle Output ^ ^ Shrink 
(hi ,h ) {hi'Jf ) {hi'\li") 
- o — o . - -
- o — (OxBFFF, 0x0000 / 
--0 
- o — , ( Oxl-hH-, 0x4000 
- o 
—O"-- (OxhhhJh . 0x0000 
<g:: 
Figure 4.4: One cycle of encoding procedure 
Weakness in the coder 
Assume ô  is a 16 bit value, where its 14 MSB are the output and the rest is 0, and 
there is no mid-range buffering. Then, Oi is very close to because given in 
(2.17), is very small. So the attacker can derive I'- from the output Oi if a symbol of 
small frequency is encoded and mid-range buffering does not occur. Also the high and 
low values in Step 2 of Section 3.1.3 are known by the attacker. 
4.2.3 A method to derive the shrinking factors from the out-
put 
If after the synchronization of the model a certain size sequence consisting of the symbol 
at the top of the frequency table is sent to the encoder, another halving will occur and 
the model will take a form in which frequencies of all symbols except the one at the 
top of the frequency table are 1 and C7/i('V̂ max) is close to Cmax- At that moment, 
the cumulative frequencies Ch{'^min) and Ci{iJrnin) for the symbol at the bottom of 
the frequency table, V'min, are 2 and 1, respectively. This is because there is an EOF 
symbol below ipndn- From (2.17) in Step 2 of Section 4.2.1, the high and low values h\ 
and /J, after encoding the symbol i/'min are calculated as. 
L/ 7 , 2(/it - Ij) hi-li 
^ / » ( V ' m a x ) C ' , , ( V ' x n a x ) 
(4.10) 
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max-where Ch(ipmajz) is close to C 
Prom (3.1) and (4.10), 
- ^ - M - ^̂  + - ^̂  + + 1 
= + r M " 1 - + - + " ( 4 . 1 1 ) 
When C / , ( V ' m a x ) is close to 16383, it is known by the attacker that the length of 
encoder's output is 14 bits and that the high and low values h'l and take one of the 
values in Section 4.2.2. 
P a t t e r n 1 hi = OxBFFF, h = 0x0000, 
P a t t e r n 2 hi = OxFFFF, li = 0x4000, 
= 0X4000+ OxBFFFs,, + 
= 0x4000+ 0xBFFFe, + 5 i B | p z ) 
P a t t e r n S hi = OxFFFF, li = 0x0000, 
Ox1FFFE(£:,,j - sij) 
(4.13) 
= OxFFFF£/,+ 
16383 
From (3.1), 
0.8001 < Shj - eij < 0.9999 
. . 0xl7FFE(eH,-e,,) . . 
^ — 16383 -
16383 
OxlFFFE(.M-e,,) 7 
^ — 16383 — ' 
= 3 (4.15) 
From (4.12), (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15), it is shown that the effect o i s h j - S i j is small. 
Define a as where ^ = {OxlFFFE, OxlTFFE, OxFFFF, OxBFFF} and assume 
that there is no mid-range buffering, and 0,4.1 is a 16 bit value, where its most significant 
14 bits is the output and the rest is 0. Because the output Oi+i is very close to /J^j, sij 
can be shown as follows. 
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P a t t e r n 1 hi = OxBFFF, k = 0x0000, 
Oj+i w OxBFFFe:»,- + a and Sn « ^ ^ (4.16) 
^^ ^ ^ OxBFFF ^ ^ 
P a t t e r n 2 hi = OxFFFF, = 0x4000, 
Oi+i « 0x4000 + OxBFFFs/,- + a and eu « ^̂^̂ ^̂  ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ — - (4.17) 
^ ^ ^ OxBFFF ^ ^ 
P a t t e r n 3 hi = OxFFFF, h = 0x0000, 
Oi+i OxFFFFeu + a and Su « ^^^—- (4.18) »+1 0 0 OxFFFF ^ ^ 
From (4.15), ^j^^rpp < 0.0001 and < 0.0001. So the lower shrinking factor 
£ij can be accurately calculated from the output. 
There are three possible patterns of the high and low values and there may be 
0.0001 error in the calculation of the lower shrinking factor from above, so the cost of 
obtaining the lower shrinking factor is 3 x 2. Notice that in P a t t e r n 2 is equal 
to Oi+i + 0x4000 in P a t t e r n 1. 
Now the lower shrinking factor eij is given and from (4.12), (4.13) and (4.14), the 
upper shrinking factor can be calculated as follows. 
P a t t e r n 1 hi = OxBFFF, h = 0x0000, 
16383 
P a t t e r n 2 hi = OxFFFF, h = 0x4000, 
ens = + ^ ^ ( / U i - 0x4000 - OxBFFFey) 
^'i + - - (4.20) 
OxBFFF 
P a t t e r n 3 hi = OxFFFF, U = 0x0000, 
16383 ^ \ 
« % + OxFFFF.,,) (4.21) 
However, the terms and are very small and o^+i is the approxima-
tion of I'i^i and so the accurate upper shrinking factor is not given by this calculation. 
Hence, to find the upper shrinking factor, brute-force is to be used. The cost is ap-
proximately 2^° because the range for the factor is between 0.9000 and 0.9999. 
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4.2.4 Analysis of the output bit sequence 
To derive the shrinking factors from the output, it is necessary to identify the output 
bit sequence for a symbol in the whole output. This section analyzes the output 
bit sequence, the relationship between a symbol encoded and its resulting output bit 
sequence, and shows a method to identify the bit sequence produced by encoding a 
symbol. 
There are two factors which hide the direct relationship between an encoded symbol 
and its output bit sequence. One is the byte buffering, that is, 8 bit blocking of output, 
and the second is mid-range buffering. Byte buffering is required for the file I/O in 
the software implementation and merges two consecutive encoding results. It causes 
the delay in the output but does not change the sequence of the output bits. The 
mid-range buffering occurs when the range is between OxCOOO and 0x4000. As a result 
of encoding a symbol ipi, some bits may be stored in the mid-range buffer and the final 
output is produced at the beginning of the output of the following symbol, ipi+i- If 
the mid-range buffer, as a result of encoding symbol ipi, contains n bits, then n bits 
are inserted between the first bit and the second bit of the output of the symbol i^i+i-
These n bits are opposite of the first bit, ie. if the first bit is 0, the n bits are all 1 
and if it is 1, the n bits are all 0. Hence it is necessary to identify the inserted bits to 
correctly derive the low value from the output. 
Method to identify the output bit sequence 
'max) After synchronization of the model, assume that the total frequency is close to Ĉ  
ie. 16383, and symbols of frequency = 1 are encoded. The following properties of the 
output bit sequence are useful in finding the beginning of a symbol in the output. 
1. If the first two bits are the same, there is no mid-range buffering. This is because 
the inserted n bits are always opposite of the first bit. 
2. The first bit of the output is always 0. 
From (4.12), (4.13), (4.14) and (4.15), the range just before the output is as 
follows. 
Pattern 1 hi = OxBFFF, k = 0x0000, 
0x0004 < < 0x1334 
0x0002 < < 0x1331 (4.22) 
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Pattern 2 hi = OxFFFF, li = 0x4000, 
0x4004 < < 0x5334 
0x4002 < < 0x5331 (4.23) 
Pattern 3 hi = OxFFFF, h = 0x0000, 
0x0006 < /I'.̂i < 0xl99A 
0x0003 < < 0x1996 (4.24) 
All the above ranges produce an output which starts with a 0. 
3. The same bit sequences repeatedly appear in the output. This is because there 
are only 6 possible ranges and if there is no mid-range buffering, the same range 
produces the same bit sequence. So with no mid-range buffering there will be 6 
different bit sequence patterns in the output. However, if the mid-range buffering 
occurs, the content of the buffer will affect the output during the output of the 
following symbol and so there may be more than 6 patterns in the output. 
The method to find the beginning of the bit sequence for a symbol is as follows 
(Figure 4.5). 
1. Choose a bit 0 in the output and assume it is the beginning of the sequence. 
If the length of the output for a symbol is 14 bits, there is a start bit in any 14 
consecutive bits of the output. If 7 bits are 0, there are 7 possible start bits. 
2. If the bit after the chosen bit is also 0, there has been no mid-range buffering. 
Notice that since a 14 bit sequence includes a start bit, there must be at least 
one 0. 
3. If <7 bits after the chosen bit are 1, the first i bits, 0 < i < a, oi a bits may be 
the result of mid-range buffering. Remove i bits from the output and construct 
the sequence without mid-range buffering. 
4. Assume that the sequence of 14 bits without mid-range buffering obtained above 
is the output for a symbol and calculate the lower shrinking factor. Using the 
method given in Section 4.2.3, calculate the value for lower shrinking factor for 
each possible range. 
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01110100101101110100110 -
i = 0 0111010010110111 
i = 1 0110100101101110 
i = 2 0101001011011101 
i = 3 0010010110111010 
i=0 010 010110111010 0 
i=1 0001011011101001 
i = 0 0 010110111010 011 
Figure 4.5: Bit patterns in an output without mid-range buffering 
Since there are 3 possible ranges, 3 calculations per symbol is required to obtain 
the lower shrinking factor. The factor may include error but it is no larger than 
0.0001. Hence the cost to find the factor is 3 x 2. 
5. Verify the result using an encoder. Encode a symbol of frequency = 1 with the 
total frequency close to 16363, applying the lower shrinking factor obtained in the 
above step. Compare the result with the original bit sequence. If the shrinking 
factor is correct, it should produce exactly the same sequence as the original. 
If it produces a different sequence, it is either because the assumption of the start 
bit is wrong or the shrinking factor is wrong. Then change i in step 3 and repeat 
the above procedure. 
From our experiments, for the sequence produced by encoding symbols at the bot-
tom of the frequency table, the number of mid-range buffered bits is generally small. 
Hence the output produced by encoding one of these symbols, including mid-range 
buffering, will not be much larger than 14 bits. In a bit sequence of slightly longer 
than 14 bits, if there are 7 possible start bits, ie. Os, and each of them produces 
1 < J < 7 , possible bit sequences because of the removing of the possible mid-range 
buffered bits, there are possible sequences for a symbol. Each sequence is ver-
ified by the above procedure (Figure 4.6). When the sequence for the first symbol is 
determined, it automatically determines the bit sequence for the next symbol in the 
output and results in a chain of possible bit sequences which grows like a tree. If the 
next sequence does not satisfy the conditions, ie. i) it does not start with 0, ii) the 
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Figure 4.6: Algorithm to find the start bit for a symbol in an output 
mid-range buffered bits that are inserted into the output of the next symbol result in a 
conflicting number, or in) applying the shrinking factor does not result in the expected 
sequence, then the sequence is wrong and hence the branch is pruned and does not 
grow further. 
Once one of the lower shrinking factors is found, the 128 bit random sequence can 
be found by using the encoder, to encode symbols of small frequencies in a way similar 
to that used in the verification of the result. By using the lower shrinking factor to 
encode the symbols, all parameters, including the high and low values and the size 
of the mid-range buffering, can be found. If the experimental results differ from the 
original sequence, the original bit sequence is analyzed in the same way and the other 
lower shrinking factor needs to be calculated. Once the two lower shrinking factors 
are known, the 128 bit random sequence can be found by applying either of the two 
shrinking factors. From our experiments, it appears that the verification process, ie. 
the comparison between the experimental results using the lower shrinking factor found 
and the original bit sequence, is sensitive to the output size of the encoding of a symbol. 
When the output size is smaller than 14 bits, the verification fails. Hence the sum of 
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all the frequencies, Ch(ipmax)̂  must be large enough to produce 14 bit output for each 
symbol. 
4.2.5 Cost of the attack 
The cost of finding the beginning of output bit sequence for a symbol is at most 
14 2̂ -® and the cost of calculating the lower shrinking factor is 3 x 2 î i To verify 
the lower shrinking factor, it is necessary to encode a symbol using the upper shrinking 
factor, which is unknown. However, the influence of the upper shrinking factor is very 
small and so it is only sufficient to only try the maximum, ie. 9999, the minimum, ie. 
9000, and a few values in between. The total cost is + 9 where 6 is the cost for the 
verification. 
The unknown part of the key is only the two upper shrinking factors, each of which 
could take a value from 0.9000 to 0.9999. Hence, the attack reduces the unknown key 
to 2^° X 2^° = 220 
4.3 Conclusion 
As shown above, there are various methods of exploiting properties of arithmetic coding 
to attack an arithmetic coding encryption system. The changes in the length of the 
output gives information about halvings. Once the model is under control, the coder 
can also be controlled using the knowledge of the model. Encoding takes the cumulative 
frequencies, the total frequency and the high and low values as parameters. Encoder's 
output which can be seen as a value, leaks information about these parameters, and so 
can be used to determine the state of the model and the coder. To protect the system, 
these properties should be carefully hidden from an attacker. 
Chapter 5 
Protection against attacks 
As can be seen in the previous chapters, there are various methods to attack arith-
metic coding encryption schemes. Since different attacks use different properties of 
the schemes, different protection methods are required. In this chapter we first ana-
lyze properties that are used in the attacks, then propose various protection strategies 
against the attacks and examine their effectiveness. The strategies are i) periodic re-
set/initialization strategy in which the model is periodically reset/initialized during 
the encoding of a message, ii) random halving point and in) extra-narrowing which 
is used in LFB scheme, iv) higher precision for the model and the coder and v) the 
higher order of the model. Then we propose new methods, ie. blocking, XORing and 
permutation of output bits, and demonstrate how each can add security to a system. 
5.1 The properties used in the attacks 
Different attacks use different properties of arithmetic coding. Although each may not 
reduce security to a large extent but by combining more than one method, it is possible 
to dramatically reduce the security of the system. In this section, we give an overview 
of the attacks and the properties, and examine how they are used in the attacks. The 
common methods used in the attacks are as follows. 
5.1.1 Repeated experiments 
LBD attack uses repeated experiments with the encoder. Repeated experiments allow 
the information about the secret, ie. the model, to be extracted while a single exper-
iment will not give enough information to break a system. If a system goes back to 
the same state, ie. the initial model, by a reset, it can be repeatedly investigated for 
different input messages and hence more and more secret information is leaked. The 
weakness of the system is that it goes back to the same state and so an attacker has 
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more opportunity to investigate the system. 
5.1.2 Controlling the model by an input message 
In BH attack, an input message is used to modify the model into a known form. The 
attack is divided into two steps. The first step is to modify the frequencies of the 
symbols into specific values. The second step is to arrange symbols in a specific order 
in the model. After this step the model is completely known to the attacker. 
Ordering the symbols is not a theoretical requirement for arithmetic coding but is 
used for less processing time. Obviously if the model does not use an ordered frequency 
table, BH attack is only successful to modify the frequencies and not the order of the 
symbols. However this will significantly slow down the processing speed. 
If a chosen plaintext attack is used, an attacker can choose a message which updates 
the model into an intended form. Since an adaptive model is updated based on an input 
message, any adaptive system can be attacked by this type of chosen plaintext attack. 
5.1.3 Controlling the coder by an input message 
In strengthened BH attack and the attack against LFB scheme, an input message is 
used to control the coder. If a symbol of a small probability is encoded, a long bit 
sequence is output. This means that the same number of bits are removed from the 
high and low values and the removed bits in the high and low values are filled by known 
values, ie. 1 and 0, respectively. Hence the secret part of the high and low values are 
reduced by the number of output bits. If a few bits are unknown, there are only few 
possible values that the high and low values can take and so it is possible to force the 
high and low values to take specific values. This attack is only possible if the model 
is known because it is necessary for an attacker to know which symbols have small 
probabilities. 
5.1.4 Analysis of the output considered as a real number 
value 
In the attack against LFB scheme, the shrinking factors are calculated from the output. 
Using the method in Section 5.1.3, a long output is produced by using a symbol of small 
probability. The high and low values will take one of the few possible values and the 
result of encoding a symbol is obtained as an output. Since the encoding calculations 
are simple, it is easy to calculate the shrinking factor from these values. 
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In the attack on the coder (Section 4.1.2), the analysis is performed on the output 
by considering it as a real number value. If two encoders having the same model 
but different initial high and low values encode the same message, there is a certain 
relationship between the two resulting outputs. If the high and low values of one of 
the encoders is known, those of the other one can be recovered by comparing the two 
outputs. 
The output is the result of a calculation that uses cumulative frequencies of symbols 
and the range. The calculations corresponding to the encoding of a single symbol 
and updating of the model, are very simple. A message is encoded by repeating this 
calculation. Encoder's output is a real number between 0 and 1, which represents 
the interval of the message. Since the output is a real value, it is possible to apply 
operations such as addition and subtraction to the output. Although the inverse of 
the calculation which produces the output from a large number of input symbols is 
complex and hence expensive and difficult to solve, the calculation for a single symbol, 
same as the calculation performed in the attack on LFB scheme, is simple and can be 
easily used in the attacks. 
5.1.5 Analysis on the output size 
The change of the output length per symbol can be used to detect the halving points. 
The probability of a symbol directly affects the length of the output. Halving causes 
noticeable change in the probabilities of symbols when the same symbol is repeatedly 
sent to the encoder, and so results in noticeable change in the output length. 
5.1.6 Properties exploited to attack systems 
From the above discussion, we can summarize the properties used in the attacks. They 
are : 
1. Reset to the same state 
2. Adaptiveness of the model 
3. Ordering of symbols in the frequency table 
4. Replacement of output bits of the high and low values by known values 
5. Relationship between the probability of a symbol and the output length 
6. Simplicity of encoding calculation 
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5.2 Protection against the attacks 
Noting the properties used in the attacks, to provide protection against the attacks, 
the following strategies can be used. 
5.2.1 Reset/initialization 
It is obvious from the above observation that after reset, a system should not return 
to the same state. That is, a reset should not be limited to default values. Rather, 
non-key parameters of the system must be changed in every reset. That is, resetting 
should result in a slightly different range each time. This will protect against attacks 
which attempt to obtain information about the key by repeated experiment on the 
same encoder state. 
In the model-based scheme, it is possible to initialize the model when a new message 
is encoded. If input messages with the same probability distribution are consecutively 
encoded, initialization results in a drop in the compression ratio as all previous adap-
tation of the model is lost. If the model is used as a key, the model is randomly chosen 
and it is very unlikely that the model represents the probability distribution of the 
message that is to be encoded. Hence, the compression ratio for the first part of the 
message will be worse than the case that the initial model matches the probability 
distribution of the message. Cleary et al estimate that for English text 1,000 bytes will 
be enough for the model to adapt. 
To protect against BH attack, Lim et al suggested periodic initialization of the 
model. However as they pointed out, if the initialization period is short, the compres-
sion ratio will be dropped. 
To initialize the encoder, because of the large number of required key bits, a pseudo 
random number generator (PRNG) can be used, and the key will be the seed value for 
the PRNG. During the initialization, the seed of the PRNG is loaded and the output 
of the PRNG is used to initialize the model and the range. In each reset, the PRNG 
output is used to reset non-key parameters of the system. If the same seed is used in 
the transmitter and the receiver and resets in the two are synchronized, encoding and 
decoding will be correctly performed. 
Transmission errors may result in a loss of synchronization between the encoder 
and the decoder. In such a case, the reset of non-key parameters may not be sufficient 
and re-initialization of models may be needed because as a result of decoding a bit 
sequence which is changed by the transmission errors the decoder's model may be in 
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a state different from the encoder's state. To initialize the encoder and the decoder 
using the PRNG output, the initialization of the model and non-key parameters in 
the encoder and in the decoder must be from the same part of the PRNG output 
bit sequence. The condition above must be satisfied regardless of the initialization 
algorithm used, otherwise the decoder cannot correctly decode the encoded messages. 
^ Since the encoder and the decoder share the same seed for the PRNG and consume 
the same amount of the PRNG output for each reset and initialization, they will 
regain the synchronization after transmission errors by the initialization. To regain the 
synchronization it is important that the encoder and the decoder are simultaneously 
initialized and to achieve this, an appropriate error control strategy will be needed. 
5.2.2 Randomizing the halving periods 
BH proposed to randomly choose Cmax- We note, as shown above, that detection of 
the halving point will not be affected by the randomization as the halving points can 
be directly detected from the output and successful re-ordering is guaranteed as long 
as a halving point is correctly detected. 
However, the attack to reduce the secret in the coder (Section 4.1.2) may be dis-
turbed. The attack requires the small probability symbols to produce long enough 
outputs and hence a small number of unknown bits in the high and low values. It is 
best if the attack is used right before a halving to minimize the number of unknown 
bits in the high and low values. This is because when Ch(iJma.x) is maximized, the 
probability of a symbol is minimized. If a halving occurs before the start of the at-
tack, Ch{ipm^x) is relatively small and hence, the probabilities of symbols are not small 
enough to produce a long output. Although it is possible to run the procedure before 
maximizing the output size is smaller and hence the number of unknown 
bits in the high and low values is larger and the attack becomes more expensive. Once 
the attacker successfully decrypts the communication (by modifying Ch(ipraa.x)), it will 
be possible to adjust her/his decoder to the changes in the halving period. 
The impact of this strategy on the compression ratio can be examined by noting 
that compression ratio depends on the halving period used. The shorter the halving 
period is the quicker the latest statistics becomes dominant in the model. When a 
halving occurs, all frequencies are halved and hence each symbol in the previous part 
of a message is counted as 0.5 while each symbol in the latest part is counted as 1 
^The details of the reset/initialization algorithms are not described in this thesis. The detailed 
analysis will be required to achieve the secure reset/initialization. 
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and so the latest part becomes dominant in the model. If the probability distribution 
of symbols does not change through the whole message, the halving period will not 
have much influence on the compression ratio. However, for a message with changing 
distribution, the compression ratio will depend on how fast the latest distribution 
becomes dominant in the model. In other words the halving period determines the 
speed of adaptation of the model. The optimal period varies with messages and if the 
period is randomly chosen, it is unlikely that it is optimal for a message. Hence this 
strategy restricts the optimal choice of the halving period. 
Examples of compression ratios with different halving periods are shown in Table 
5.1. The files are from Calgary/Canterbury text compression corpus [WB89]. In the 
initial model, all frequencies are set to 1. For English text sources, larger halving 
periods results in better compression but for the object files and the source codes, if 
the periods are larger than certain values, reduction in the ratios will be reduced. For 
o b j l file, the best compression is achieved at C^ax == 1,000 and the compression ratio 
drops by about 7.5 % when C^ax = 16,000. Similarly, obj2 file is best compressed when 
C'max = 2,000 and has about 2.5 % drop in compression ratio when C^ax = 16,000. 
This could be because object files will have specific structures, such as references to 
external entries, static data and instructions and so it is quite likely that each part 
has different probability distribution of symbols. The quicker the model adapts to the 
source statistics, the better the compression ratio will be. In such cases, the halving 
period will have influence on the compression ratio. 
Halving period 
File Size Contents 500 1,000 2,000 4,000 8,000 16,000 
bib 111261 English text 6.144 5.625 5.405 5.304 5.256 5.234 
bookl 768771 English text 5.551 4.960 4.724 4.619 4.569 4.547 
geo 102400 Geophysical data 5.904 5.701 5.657 5.652 5.654 5.656 
objl 21504 Compiled code for Vax 5.743 5.551 5.618 5.743 5.866 5.968 
obj2 246814 Compiled code for Mac 6.219 5.936 5.891 5.929 5.997 6.067 
progc 39611 C source code 5.910 5.457 5.297 5.243 5.227 5.234 
progp 49379 Pascal source code 5.617 5.131 4.962 4.900 4.890 4.894 
gs 689352 Compiled code for Linux 5.983 5.709 5.669 5.705 5.763 5.827 
Table 5.1: Halving periods and compression ratios (bits/symbol) 
5.2.3 Extra-narrowing of interval 
This method is used by LFB scheme and was claimed to be resistant against BH 
attack. However, as long as it is possible to detect halving points, this mechanism can 
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not avoid over-flooding and re-ordering and so it cannot prevent the attack. The aim 
of this approach is to add extra-complexity to the coder and to make synchronization 
of the coder more difficult. However as shown in the previous chapter, it is possible 
to largely reduce the attacking cost and hence the method does not provide strong 
security. 
The cost of this strategy is nearly doubling the processing time of the input data. 
This is because extra-narrowing is equivalent to encoding another symbol and the 
encoding procedure takes the major part of the processing time. 
5.2.4 Higher precision of the model and the coder 
Using 32 bit integer arithmetic for the frequencies in the model will allow setting of 
-̂ max to much larger values and hence longer strings for over-flooding are required. 
This provides protection against the BH attack. For example, if F^ax = 268,000, 000, 
a string of more than 100,000,000 symbols is required to cause a halving. This will 
increase security but will affect the compression ratio because increase in halving period 
means slower adaptation to source statistics which could drop the compression ratio. 
More detail is given in Section 5.2.2. 
To increase coder's security, higher precision for the high and low values can be 
used. Assume the number of bits for the high and low values is Bj.. If the smallest 
probability in the model is Pniin, then the maximum length of the output for a symbol 
is -/o^2-Pniin bits. During the output procedure the output bits are removed from the 
high and low values and -log^.P^in bits of the high and low values are filled with known 
values, ie. 1 and 0. So the number of unknown bits in the high and the low values is 
Br + log'?. -Pmin. In the case of WNC implementation , the number of unknown bits is 
16 — 14 = 2. If the high and the low values are 32 bits and the same model is used, the 
number of unknown bits becomes 32 - 14 = 18 bits. In this case, even if the symbols 
of the smallest probability are sent, the high and the low values can take 2̂® possible 
values and hence coder's security is increased. The cost of employing higher precision 
is additional calculation time. 
5.2.5 Higher order of the model 
To avoid BH attack, the length of the sequence required for synchronization can be 
increased. A method of increasing this length is to use higher order models such as 
PPM models. If the sequence is long enough (compared with the size of most messages). 
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then by using a reset that is automatically invoked after a certain length input, the 
attacker will be effectively stopped from synchronizing the model. If the reset interval 
is chosen longer than most messages, it will not have any effect on the data compression 
performance. 
Irvine [Irv95] showed a method of attacking PPM system using BH approach. In this 
attack it is necessary to produce all possible nodes of the tree. To protect against this 
attack he suggested a method of pruning the model using a pseudo-random sequence. 
An important consideration in using higher order models is the required memory 
and processing time. Although using higher order models will result in better com-
pression ratio, because of memory and speed requirements it might not be suitable for 
many applications. 
In general requiring longer sequences to control the model implies slower adaptation 
of the model to an input. Since the initial model is randomly chosen (key), it may be 
far from optimal for an incoming message and so slower adaptation will result in a drop 
in compression ratio. 
5.2.6 XORing the output with pseudo-random sequence 
Various methods can be used to protect against mathematical analysis of the output 
and hiding the true output of the encoder. A simple method is to mask the output by 
XORing the output with a pseudo-random sequence. The seed of the pseudo-random 
generator is part of the key and the encoder's output is XORed with the sequence. 
Key 
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Figure 5.1: Encryption of output using random number sequence 
This system is attractive because the PRNG need not be cryptographically strong 
and a linear feedback shift register (LFSR) will suffice. This is because the coder output 
is compressed and hence has very high entropy and the role of PRNG is to simply mask 
this output. This means that masking does not introduce large computation cost and 
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no notable degradation of speed will occur. However the weakness of this system is that 
if the true encoder output is known, the pseudo-random sequence can be revealed and 
in the case of LFSR systems, the seed of PRNG will be determined. As shown above, 
one of the proposed attacks (Section 4.1.2) produces a known output bit sequence and 
so can be used to find the output of LFSR and derive the seed. 
5.2.7 Blocking 
Another method of providing protection against attacks is blocking that is controlled 
by the encryption system. That is, an output will be released as blocks of bits where 
the size of the block is fixed and determined by the combined encryption-compression 
software. Blocking muddles the relationship between input symbols and the output 
bit string and makes the analysis of the output more difficult. However, if it is the 
sole method of protection, the added strength is not sufficient. This is because the 
relationship between the last output symbol and the last block is clear and it is known 
that all or part of the substring for the last symbol will be in the block. More security 
can be obtained by permuting bits in a block. 
5.2.8 Permutation 
Using permutation of encoder's output, it is possible to hide the properties of the 
output and the relationship between input and output, and so it is more difficult to 
do the inverse calculation of encoding. For the permutation to be executed on a fixed 
size output block, the output will be buffered and hence, blocking is applied. 
The weakness is that if the true output bits are known, they may leak information 
about how each bit is permuted. For example, the attack in Section 4.1.2 can produce 
an output of known bit patterns and because the patterns are known and they are 
repeated in the output, it could leak information about the permutation. 
XORing can hide the true information so if it is combined with permutation, it will 
give better security to the system. The advantage of this method is that it is possible 
to have a less expensive and more secure system by combining simple algorithms. 
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5.3 Conclusion 
Attacks use different properties and so protection mechanisms vary with attacks. Adding 
security in general reduces the compression ratio but the amount of reduction de-
pends on the chosen method. Repeated experiments can be easily avoided by re-
set/initialization strategy. Attacks that use adaptiveness of the model are more diffi-
cult to avoid without sacrificing compression ratio. By applying higher precision for 
the frequencies in the model, the cost of the attack will grow to impractical level but 
the speed of adaptation will drop. Higher order models possibly provide better security 
but with much larger memory and to some extent computational requirement. This 
limits their applications. Though higher precision for the coder does not provide strong 
enough security by itself, combined with other methods, it may result in reasonably 
good security. The cost may not be a problem because 32 bit architecture, and hence 
64 bits for the result (multiplying two 32 bit numbers), is becoming common in CPU 
technologies. Analysis of encoder's output can be avoided by hiding the true output. 
The security of XOR/permutation/blocking is discussed in the following chapter. 
Chapter 6 
Comments on integrated encryption after 
compression schemes 
In arithmetic coding encryption systems the secret key consists of the model and the 
coder, individually or together. The model has a larger number of variables (frequency 
counts of the symbols) than the coder (the high and low values). Although there are 
some additional variables in the LFB scheme, the model has many more variables. Most 
of the parameters change dynamically with an input message and security is achieved 
by hiding the initial values of the parameters. In this chapter, we analyze security 
of the methods discussed in the previous chapter. Firstly we introduce two general 
models of hiding compressed output. Then we compare the two models when i) pure 
compression followed by encryption is used, and ii) a secure compression algorithm is 
used. Finally we summarize the result. 
6.1 Methods to hide encoder's output 
Encoder's output leaks information. To achieve strong security, it is necessary to hide 
the true output of the encoder. As shown in the previous chapter, XOR, permutation 
and blocking could possibly enhance the security. In this section, we analyze each of 
these techniques and examine their properties. 
6.1.1 Models to hide the true output 
Type 1 This is the simple combination of compression and encryption algorithms. 
The encryption is performed after compressing the input. In this case encryption 
algorithm input depends on the output of the compression and hence, indirectly 
on an input message. 
Type 2 In this system encoder's output is masked by the output of the encryption 
part. The assumed encryption algorithm is a pseudo-random generater which 
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Type 1 Type 2 
Figure 6.1: Models to hide the true output 
produces mask bits independent of the input message. 
We assume that the data compression algorithm is an adaptive arithmetic coding 
and its performance in both cases is the same. Also in both cases the encryption 
algorithm provides the same level of security and has the same cost. We also assume 
that the compression algorithm does not provide security, ie. it is a pure compression 
algorithm. The encryption is assumed to be a block cipher. 
6.2 Comparison between Type 1 and Type 2 
6.2.1 Speed 
In terms of throughput, both systems are equivalent. However, Type 1 introduces a 
larger delay in producing the output from the input. 
Let Scomp and Tcomp be the average required time to compress a symbol and to output 
a block, respectively. Let Ŝ nc and r̂ nc be the average required time to encrypt a block 
and to output an encrypted block, respectively. We assume that the compression and 
the encryption can be executed in parallel in Type 2 system. In Type 1 system, the 
encryption process has to wait for the output of the compression. We also assume that 
the procedures of compression and encryption (Scomp and ignc) and outputting their 
results (Tcamp and T n̂c) can be executed in parallel. This allows overlapping of Scomp 
and Jenc with Tcomp and r̂ nc respectively. The values of Ŝ omp and Tcomp may vary with 
symbols' probabilities but for the simplicity, we assume that the required time is equal. 
In type 1 system, the delay of the output from its input is given by S comp H" '^comp ¿^enc • 
We assume that the time required for XOR is very small and hence, can be ignored. 
In Type 2 system, the delay to produce the output from the corresponding input is 
Scomp + '''ccmip when Scomp+Tcomp > Senc+Tenc and ignc+Tenc when Scomp+^comp < «^enc+'^'enc-
So the throughput is determined by the slower of the compression or the encryption. 
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6.2.2 Security 
Both systems are capable of hiding the true output of the compression system. How-
ever, Type 2 system has a restriction on the type of the encryption system. Since the 
encryption output is XORed with the compressed output, the encryption of Type 2 
system is effectively a substitution cipher. When the output of the compression part is 
known, the output sequence of the encryption part can be revealed by a plaintext at-
tack. Since the compression system is assumed not to provide any security, an attacker 
can easily reproduce the compressed output if an input message is known. Then the se-
quence produced by the encryption part can be discovered by XORing the reproduced 
sequence and the output of Type 2 system. Since a simple pseudo-random generater 
is known to be weak, the system cannot provide strong security. In case of Type 1 
system, there are more choices for the encryption algorithm. It can be a substitution 
cipher, a permutation or a combination of both. 
For both systems, the security strength is determined solely by the security of the 
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encryption algorithm. Known plaintext or chosen plaintext attacks are possible on 
the systems. However, the choice of an input message would be more limited in the 
combined compression and encryption system than a system without compression. To 
make the compression system produce specific output sequence, it will be necessary to 
do a reverse calculation of encoding which involves the parameters such as symbols' 
frequencies and the high and low values. So it is more costly to produce a specific 
output sequence of symbols in the compression system, and in fact some sequences of 
symbols may be simply impossible to produce. 
6.3 Pure compression versus compression-encryption 
schemes 
In both Type 1 and 2 systems, the compression algorithm can be either a pure com-
pression or a compression-encryption scheme. In the following, we look at the benefits 
of replacing a pure compression algorithm by a compression-encryption algorithm. 
6.3.1 Controlling input messages of encryption algorithm 
It will be much more difficult to produce a specific output sequence in a system with a 
combined compression-encryption algorithm than with a pure compression algorithm. 
This is because there is a considerable number of unknown parameters in the com-
pression part of a compression-encryption system. BH attack may be used to reveal 
the parameters but it is more costly. That is, the cost of BH attack to make the pa-
rameters known must also be included in the assessment. However, if BH attack is 
feasible (in terms of the cost,) the system does not provide strong security. Hence if 
the compression-encryption system itself does not provide the resistance against BH 
attack, the whole system will not be resistant against BH attack either. 
6.3.2 Resistance against statistical attacks 
For the encryption part of the system, statistical attacks would become more difficult 
because the input to the encryption algorithm is compressed and hence has less re-
dundancy. However, statistical attacks against the compression-encryption part would 
work because the model is adaptive and hence reflects the statistical properties of the 
input sequence. When the model is simple, ie. models of lower order, if the statistical 
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behavior of the source is known, it would not be difficult to estimate the parame-
ters of the model. Security of the higher order model is still an open problem but 
the behavior of the model is more or less the same. In general, in arithmetic coding, 
re-synchronizing the system in the middle of transmission is difficult. However, the 
difficulty is from communication point of view and not security point of view and even 
with extra measure the system still cannot provide enough security. 
6.3.3 Efficiency 
As long as a lower order model is used, the combined compression and encryption 
scheme does not provide strong security. The question to be answered is whether adding 
secret parameters into the coder is more efficient, or adding encryption algorithm to 
the coder. Taking into account factors such as speed, compression ratio, and flexibility 
of the design, with a careful choice of the encryption algorithm, adding encryption 
after compression may have numerous benefits. In general regardless of the chosen 
approach, the drop in the compression performance should be minimized. Using the 
encryption after compression is not limited to arithmetic coding compression but can 
be used with any other compression method. Making the two processes separate results 
in each algorithm in the system to be simple and less expensive. This also requires 
fewer extra-bits in the output which will be only added to the padding of the last block 
of the output. The impact on the compression performance, that is, compression ratio 
and compression speed, will also be negligible compared to methods such as extra-
narrowing. 
6.4 Conclusion 
Lower order models cannot provide strong security. Adding secret parameters to the 
coder could improve security but it would impose restrictions on the system. By 
adding encryption algorithm after arithmetic coding encryption schemes, security can 
be improved and more flexibility can be obtained. The advantage of this approach is 
that it can be used in combination with other compression algorithms. 
Chapter 7 
Conclusion 
Secure compression schemes have various benefits. By achieving compression and secu-
rity through a single algorithm, less overhead could be expected. In general efficiency 
is improved by compressing data before encryption. This goal is also achieved by se-
cure compression schemes. Arithmetic coding is an optimal coding scheme. If it can 
also provide security the benefits are achieved. Adaptive arithmetic coding encryption 
schemes have a large key space (initial model), and it is difficult to re-gain the syn-
chronization in the middle of the transmission. These properties make them attractive 
for providing security. 
We had a careful study of the arithmetic coding encryption schemes and demon-
strated various attacks. We proposed a number of protection mechanisms and looked 
at their security. In this chapter, first we summarize the schemes and then review the 
attacks. Next we comment on the weaknesses of the schemes and their security, and 
conclude with some final remarks. 
7.1 Schemes 
The schemes are divided into two classes : model-based schemes which use the model 
as the secret, and coder-based schemes in which additional secret parameters are used 
to strengthen the security of the coder. The two classes can be combined together. The 
secret key of a model-based arithmetic coding encryption scheme is the initial model 
which may be explicitly given as a key or may be the result of updating by the initial 
string. An attack against the schemes may try to discover the key, ie. the initial model, 
or try to gain synchronization in the middle of the transmission without finding the 
key. As the attacks show, both approaches are valid. 
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7.2 Attacks 
BH attack shows that it is easy to reduce the key space by a chosen plaintext attack 
when the order of the model is low. We showed that the output of the encoder leaks 
much more information than expected. The average output length per symbol can 
give information about halving points. When the model is known, it is easy to discover 
coder's parameters, ie. the high and low values, from encoder's output and analyzing 
encoder's output as a value, is useful in some attacks. The output obtained by encoding 
a symbol at the bottom of the frequency table leaks the information about the low value. 
Some of the attacks use the property that the encoding/decoding calculation for each 
symbol is simple although the calculation of a whole message will include high order 
parameters. In the calculation, only five parameters are involved, ie. the upper and 
lower cumulative frequencies of a symbol, the total cumulative frequency, and the high 
and low values. 
7.3 Weaknesses and security 
One of the weaknesses of the schemes is the adaptiveness of the model. Since the 
model is updated as to follow the distribution of symbols in a message, it can be 
manipulated by an input message. This can be exploited by statistical attacks when 
distribution of the source is known. Using the higher order model may be one way 
to improving security. As shown in [Irv95], BH attack will require a much longer 
message to synchronize the model and hence it becomes more impractical. However, 
the level of security against BH attack and other statistical attacks is still unknown. 
Also the disadvantage of the higher order model is its memory requirement. Lower 
order models will achieve less compression compared to the higher order models but 
its smaller memory requirement could be attractive for various applications. 
If the model cannot provide strong security, the security of the system has to rely 
on the coder. The coder has little security without any additional mechanism and so 
the coder-based schemes use additional mechanisms. As shown in the attack, known 
coder-based schemes do not provide strong security. Adding other secret parameters 
to the coder may strengthen the security but they would impose restrictions on the 
design. 
Adding encryption algorithms such as XORing with a pseudo-random generator and 
a permutation can be a better choice. It will give much flexibility in the design and it 
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can be also used with other types of compression systems. Also compared to the model-
based schemes a better resistance against statistical attacks can be expected. The 
adaptive model itself would not have strong resistance against statistical attacks due 
to its adaptive nature. However, the additional encryption algorithm after combined 
encryption and compression, will have an input with less redundancy (compressed by 
the encoder), and so it has the advantage against the attacks. To achieve a certain level 
of security, encryption after a combined compression and encryption system will require 
less security than the encryption after a compression only system. The important point 
for the added encryption system is that the compressor and the encryption algorithm 
should be indivisible. Otherwise the encryption part can be independently attacked. 
7.4 Further work 
As we mentioned above, the security of arithmetic coding encryption schemes with the 
higher order model is an open problem. There are several questions to be answered 
such as whether or not it is possible to improve BH attack so as to reduce the message 
size required to over-flood the model, and how much resistant against statistical attacks 
the model is. There are different types of higher order models such as PPMA [Irv95], 
PPMZ and PPM* [Blo98] which have different properties [Irv95]. Then an interesting 
question would be whether or not it is possible to design a model which takes the 
security into account. 
To choose an initial model, it is generally said that the model is randomly chosen. 
However the conditions that the random model must satisfy are not described in details. 
For example, when the frequency of each symbol is uniformly chosen from the values 
between 1 and 10 then the cardinality of the set of symbols that have the same frequency 
is roughly the same for all values from 1 to 10. Then two models initialized in this 
way will have the same frequency sets but different order of symbols. For such models, 
discovering the order is easy by a plaintext attack. For example, when A is encoded 
and the result of attacker's decoder is X, by replacing X by A, it is possible to correct 
the order of symbols. In this case, the order of symbols does not provide any security. 
This means that to design a practically secure system, much more details of the system 
must be examined. 
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Appendix A 
Finding the high and low values of the 
coder 
A. l Experiment 
In this experiment the method described in Section 4.1.2 is used. 
The original compressed data was produced using a message "Test message" and 
the high and low values 54321 (0xd431) and 12345 (0x3039) respectively. Then 0 was 
set to the low value and the high value was changed from 32769 to 65535, one at a 
time, and in each case the encoder's output was compared with the original output. 
The experiment was run on Pentium 150 MHz machine with 32M bytes memory, with 
Linux OS. 
We found more than one possible high values. For example, the correct pair is 
(54321, 12345) but also the pairs (54225, 12540) and (54353, 12279) can correctly 
decode the message. There may be more than one pair of high and low values which 
can correctly decode. 
A.2 Result of the experiment 
### message = "Test message" 
low = 12345 (0x3039) 
high = 54321 (0xd431) 
range = 41976 (0xa3f8) 
### low = 0 (0x0000) 
range = 32769 (0x8001) 
increment by 1 (0x0001) 
while high <= 65535 (Oxffff) 
### ( 1) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41685 (0xa2d5) 
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6d 5c 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 f c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### ( 2) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41688 (0xa2d8) 
6d 5e 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 f a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### ( 3) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41691 (0xa2db) 
6d 60 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 f 8 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### ( 4) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41834 (0xa36a) 
6d cO 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 98 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### ( 5) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41836 (0xa36c) 
6d c l 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 97 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### ( 6) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41837 (0xa36d) 
6d c2 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 96 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### ( 7) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41839 (0xa36f) 
6d c3 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 95 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### ( 8) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41840 (0xa370) 
6d c4 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 94 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### ( 9) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41841 (0xa37l) 
6d c5 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 93 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (10) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41842 (0xa372) 
6d c5 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 93 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (11) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41843 (0xa373) 
6d c6 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 92 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (12) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41844 (0xa374) 
6d c7 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 91 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (13) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41845 (0xa375) 
6d c7 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 91 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
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### (14) low = = 0 (0x0000) high = 41846 (0xa376) 
6d c8 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 90 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (15) low = = 0 (0x0000) high = 41847 (0xa377) 
6d c9 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 8f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (16) low = = 0 (0x0000) high = 41848 (0xa378) 
6d c9 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 8f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (17) low = = 0 (0x0000) high = 41849 (0xa379) 
6d ca 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 Be 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (18) low = = 0 (0x0000) high = 41850 (0xa37a) 
6d cb 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 8d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (19) low = = 0 (0x0000) high = 41851 (0xa37b) 
6d cb 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 8d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (20) low = = 0 (0x0000) high = 41852 (0xa37c) 
6d c c 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 8c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (21) low = = 0 (0x0000) high = 41853 (Oxa37d) 
6d cd 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 8b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (22) low : = 0 (0x0000) high = 41854 (Oxa37e) 
6d cd 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 8b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (23) low = = 0 (0x0000) high = 41855 (Oxa37f) 
6d ce 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 8a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (24) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41856 (0xa380) 
6d c f 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 89 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (25) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41857 (0xa38l) 
6d c f 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 89 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (26) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41858 (0xa382) 
6d dO 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
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30 88 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (27) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41859 (0xa383) 
6d d l 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 87 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (28) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41860 (0xa384) 
6d d l 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 87 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (29) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41861 (0xa385) 
6d d2 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (30) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41862 (0xa386) 
6d d3 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 85 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (31) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41863 (0xa387) 
6d d3 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 85 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (32) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41864 (0xa388) 
6d d4 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 84 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (33) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41865 (0xa389) 
6d d5 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 83 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (34) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41866 (0xa38a) 
6d d5 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 83 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (35) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41867 (0xa38b) 
6d d6 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 82 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (36) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41868 (0xa38c) 
6d d7 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (37) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41869 (0xa38d) 
6d d7 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 81 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (38) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41870 (0xa38e) 
6d d8 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (39) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41871 (0xa38f ) 
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6d d9 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 7f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (40) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41872 (0xa390) 
6d d9 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 7f 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (41) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41873 (0xa39l) 
6d da 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 7e 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (42) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41874 (0xa392) 
6d db 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 7d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (43) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41875 (0xa393) 
6d db 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 7d 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (44) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41876 (0xa394) 
6d dc 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 7c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (45) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41877 (0xa395) 
6d dd 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 7b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (46) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41878 (0xa396) 
6d dd 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 7b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (47) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41879 (0xa397) 
6d de 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 7a 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (48) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41880 (0xa398) 
6d df 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (49) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41881 (0xa399) 
6d df 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 79 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (50) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41882 (0xa39a) 
6d eO 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 78 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (51) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41883 (0xa39b) 
6d e l 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
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### (52) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 41884 (0xa39c) 
6d e l 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 77 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (53) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42025 (0xa429) 
6e 40 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 18 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (54) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42026 (0xa42a) 
6e 41 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 17 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (55) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42028 (0xa42c) 
6e 42 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (56) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42029 (0xa42d) 
6e 43 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 15 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (57) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42031 (0xa42f ) 
6e 44 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (58) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42032 (0xa430) 
6e 45 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (59) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42034 (0xa432) 
6e 46 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 12 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (60) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42035 (0xa433) 
6e 47 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (61) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42037 (0xa435) 
6e 48 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 10 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (62) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42038 (0xa436) 
6e 49 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 Of 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (63) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42040 (0xa438) 
6e 4a 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
30 Oe 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (64) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42041 (0xa439) 
6e 4b 44 86 ae 14 f c d4 64 f 7 09 68 48 
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30 Od 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (65) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42043 (0xa43b) 
6e 4c 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 Oc 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (66) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42044 (0xa43c) 
6e 4d 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 Ob 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (67) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42047 (Oxa43f) 
6e 4f 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 09 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (68) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42050 (Oxa442) 
6e 51 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 07 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (69) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42053 (0xa445) 
6e 53 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (70) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42056 (0xa448) 
6e 55 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (71) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42059 (0xa44b) 
6e 57 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
30 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (72) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42062 (0xa44e) 
6e 59 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
2f ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (73) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42065 (0xa45l) 
6e 5b 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
2f fd 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (74) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42068 (0xa454) 
6e 5d 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
2f fb 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (75) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42071 (0xa457) 
6e 5f 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
2f f9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
### (76) low = 0 (0x0000) high = 42074 (0xa45a) 
6e 61 44 86 ae 14 fc d4 64 f7 09 68 48 
2f f7 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
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A.3 Source list 
A.3.1 shell script 
#!/biii/sh 
TXT="Test message" 
CNT=0 
0RGL=12345 
0RGH=54321 
BASE=0 
WIDTH='expr ${ORGH} - ${ORGL}' 
RANGE='expr 65539 / 2' 
MAXHIGH=65535 
INC=1 
echo "### message = \"${TXT}\"" 
printf " low = Id (0x7.04x)\n" $"CORGL> ${ORGL> 
printf " high = Id (0xy.04x)\ii" ${ORGH> ${ORGH> 
printf " range = V.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${WIDTH} ${WIDTH} 
echo -n "${1X1}" >orgtxt 
adaptive .encode 0 $-CORGL} $-CORGH> <orgtxt 2>/dev/null >orgdat 
../tool/hexdsp <orgdat >hexdat 
printf "### low = y.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${BASE} ${BASE> 
printf " range = y.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${RANGE> $-CRANGE> 
printf " increment by y.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${INC> $-ClNC} 
printf " while high <= y.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${MAXHIGH} ${MAXHIGH> 
LDW=${BASE} 
HIGH='expr $-CBASE> + ${RANGE}' 
while C $-CHIGH> -le $-CMAXHIGH} ] 
do 
adaptive.encode 0 ${LOW} $-CHIGH} <orgtxt 2>/dev/null I ../tool/hexdsp >temp 
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NEWLOW='../tool/hexdiff hexdat temp 2>datl' 
if [ $? = 1 ] 
then 
CNT='expr ${CNT} + 1' 
printf "### (y.2d)" ${CNT} 
printf " low = y.d (0xy.04x)" ${LDW} $-CLDW} 
printf " high = V.d (0xy.04x)\n" ${HIGH} ${HIGH> 
cat temp 
cat datl 
NEWHIGH='expr ${NEWLDW} + ${HIGH}' 
adaptive_decode 0 \ 
${NEWLDW} ${NEWHIGH} 2>/dev/null <orgdat >cmptxt 2>/dev/niill 
diff orgtxt cmptxt 
fi 
RANGE='expr ${RANGE} + ${INC>' 
HIGH='expr ${BASE> + ${RANGE}' 
done 
A . 3 . 2 h e x d s p . c 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <miistd.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
/ * 
* Reverse the bits in the output. 
*/ 
int 
reverse(int val) 
"C 
int cnt; 
int ret; 
for (cnt = 0, ret = 0; cnt < 8; cnt++) { 
ret « = 1; 
ret 1= val & 1; 
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val » = 1; 
> 
return ret; 
} 
int 
m a i n O 
{ 
int ch; 
int val; 
while ((ch = getcharO) != EOF) { 
val = reverse(ch); /* reverse bits. */ 
printf ("y.02x val & OxOff) ; /* print a byte in hex. */ 
> 
putcharC '\nO ; 
return 0; } 
A.3.3 hexdiff.c 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include <unistd.h> 
#include <stdlib.h> 
#include <memory.h> 
/* 
* Input two files, each of which contains a number in hex format 
* and calculate the difference of the two numbers. 
* Print the difference to stderr 
* and print the MSB 16 bits of the difference to stdout. 
* The exit code is 1 when 17th and the following bits are 0. 
* Otherwise, the exit code is 0. 
*/ 
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int 
mainCint argc, char* argvC]) 
{ 
FILE* fpl; /* file 1 */ 
FILE* fp2; /* file 2 */ 
int Chi [4096] 
int ch2C4096] 
int val[4096] 
int cntl, cnt2; 
int flgl, flg2; 
int ov; 
int ret; 
if (argc != 3) { 
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: hexdiff filel file2\n"); 
return 1; 
} 
/* open files. */ 
fpl = fopenCargvCl], "r") ; 
fp2 = fopen(argvC2], "r"); 
if (fpl == NULL 1 I fp2 == NULL) { 
fprintf(stderr, "cannot open file\n"); 
return 1; 
} 
/* read two numbers in the files. */ 
ineraset(chl, 0, sizeof (chl) ) ; 
memset(ch2, 0, sizeof(ch2)); 
flgl = flg2 = 1; 
cntl = cnt2 = 0; 
while (fscanf(fpl, "V.x", &chl[cntl]) == 1) { 
chl[cntl] &= OxOff; /* must be 2 digits */ 
cntl++; 
} 
while (fscanf(fp2, "V.x", &ch2[cnt2]) == 1) { 
ch2[cnt2] &= OxOff; /* must be 2 digits */ 
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c i i t 2 + + ; 
} 
/ * c l o s e f i l e s . * / 
f c l o s e ( f p l ) ; 
f c l o s e ( f p 2 ) ; 
/ * a d j u s t t h e p r e c i s i o n ( l e n g t h ) o f t h e n u m b e r s . * / 
i f ( e n t i < c n t 2 ) 
e n t i = c n t 2 ; 
/ * c a l c u l a t e t h e d i f f e r e n c e o f 2 n u m b e r s . * / 
c n t 2 = e n t i ; 
o v = 0 ; 
w h i l e ( e n t i > 0 ) { 
e n t i — ; 
v a i [ e n t i ] = e h i [ e n t i ] - e h 2 [ e n t l ] - o v ; 
i f ( v a i [ e n t i ] < 0 ) { 
o v = 1 ; 
v a i [ e n t i ] + = 0 x 1 0 0 ; 
} 
e l s e 
o v = 0 ; 
} 
/ * p r i n t t h e d i f f e r e n c e . * / 
r e t - 1 ; 
f o r ( e n t i = 0 ; e n t i < c n t 2 ; e n t l + + ) { 
f p r i n t f ( s t d e r r , "•/.02x v a l [ e n t l ] ) ; 
i f ( e n t i > = 2 & & v a i [ e n t i ] ! = 0 ) 
r e t = 0 ; 
} 
f p u t c ( ' \ n ' , s t d e r r ) ; 
/ * p r i n t M S B 1 6 b i t s o f t h e d i f f e r e n c e . * / 
p r i n t f ( ' " / . d X n " , v a l [ 0 ] * 2 5 6 + v a l [ l ] ) ; 
r e t u r n r e t ; 
} 
Appendix B 
Calculation of bits/symbol 
The average bits/symbol for each n symbols can be used to detect halving points 
(4.1.1). It would be easier to detect halving points by smoothing the change in the 
average by calculating the average of consecutive j values. The example is shown as 
follows. 
The calculation of the average is 
J 
(B.l) 
where Vi is the bits/symbol of the ith block. The following graph shows the bits/symbol 
using the above calculation with j = 3, 5, 7 and 9. 
bitVsYm 
halving halving halving 
Figure B.l: Smoothing of the bits/symbol values 
Appendix C 
Finding lower shrinking factors of the 
combined scheme 
C.l The experiment 
We conducted an attack on the LFB combined scheme (4.2) 
All the frequencies of the initial model is set to 1. Whether or not the model is 
randomly chosen is not important in this attack because the attack does not try to 
discover the initial model and so the initial model does not have any influence on the 
attack. The attack starts in a part of the output where the symbols at the bottom of 
the frequency table are encoded. 
The parameters used in the experiment are as follows. 
• initial low value = 0x1234 
• initial high value = 0xDBA9 
• lower shrink factor 0 = 349 
• upper shrink factor 0 = 9124 
• lower shrink factor 1 = 541 
• upper shrink factor 1 = 9978 
• 128 bit random sequence = 0x714556410728AD711B16755967F8EE7C 
After sampling the output of the encoder, a program which tries to find the lower 
shrinking factors, analyzed the output. The result of the experiment is shown in the 
next section. 
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C.2 The result of the experiment 
Bit 0 (00100011011101110000100011110010) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 1 (01000110111011100001000111100100) 
sh high 9000 
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(010001101110111) 
mid-range buf : before(1) after(0) 
see Bit 16 
sh high 9500 
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(010001101110111) 
mid-range buf : before(1) after(O) 
see Bit 16 
sh high 9999 
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(010001101110111) 
mid-range buf : before(l) after(O) 
see Bit 16 
Bit 3 (00011011101110000100011110010001) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 4 (00110111011100001000111100100010) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 5 (01101110111000010001111001000100) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 8 (01110111000010001111001000110111) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 12 (01110000100011110010001101110111) 
sh high 9000 
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org(OOOOlOOOllllOOlO) 
before(0) after(l) 
org(OOOOlOOOllllOOlO) 
before(0) after(l) 
org(OOOOlOOOllllOOlO) 
before(0) after(l) 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 16 (00001000111100100011011101110000) 
sh high 9000 
sh low( 349) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 29 
sh high 9500 
sh low( 349) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 29 
sh high 9999 
sh low( 349) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 29 
Bit 17 (00010001111001000110111011100000) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 18 (00100011110010001101110111000000) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 19 (01000111100100011011101110000000) 
sh high 9000 
sh low( 788) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 33 
sh high 9500 
sh low( 788) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 33 
sh high 9999 
sh low( 788) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 33 
Bit 21 (00011110010001101110111000011011) 
sh high 9000 
tst(OOOOlOOOllllO) 
tst(OOOOlOOOllllO) 
tst(OOOOlOOOllllO) 
org(OOOOllllOOlOOOll) 
before(1) after(l) 
org(OOOOllllOOlOOOll) 
before(1) after(l) 
org(OOOOllllOOlOOOll) 
before(1) after(l) 
tst(OlOOOllllOOlOO) 
tst(OlOOOllllOOlOO) 
tst(OlOOOllllOOlOO) 
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tst(01111001000110111) 
tst(01111001000110111) 
tst(01111001000110111) 
tst(01111001000110111) 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 22 (00111100100011011101110000110110) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 23 (01111001000110111011100001101100) 
sh high 9000 
sh low( 923) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 40 
sh low( 692) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 40 
sh high 9500 
sh low( 923) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 40 
sh low( 692) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 40 
sh high 9999 
sh low( 923) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 40 
sh low( 692) bits 
mid-range buf 
see Bit 40 
Bit 28 (00100011011101110000110111011100) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 29 (01000110111011100001101110111000) 
sh high 9000 
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(OlOOOllOlllOlll) 
mid-range buf : before(1) after(O) 
see Bit 44 
sh high 9500 
org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) 
before(4) after(l) 
org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) 
before(4) after(l) 
org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) 
before(4) after(l) 
org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) 
before(4) after(l) 
org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) 
before(4) after(l) 
org(OOOlOOOllOlllOll) 
before(4) after(1) 
tst (01111001000110111) 
tst (01111001000110111) 
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sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(010001101110111) 
mid-range buf : before(1) after(O) 
see Bit 44 
sh high 9999 
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(OlOOOllOlllOlll) 
mid-range buf : before(1) after(O) 
see Bit 44 
Bit 31 (00011011101110000110111011100001) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 32 (00110111011100001101110111000010) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 33 (01101110111000011011101110000100) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 36 (01110111000011011101110000110111) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 40 (01110000110111011100001101110111) 
sh high 9000 
sh high 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 44 (00001101110111000011011101110000) 
sh high 9000 
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(00001101110111) 
mid-range buf : before(0) after(0) 
see Bit 58 
sh high 9500 
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(00001101110111) 
mid-range buf : before(0) after(0) 
see Bit 58 
sh high 9999 
sh low( 541) bits : org(OOOOllOlllOlllOO) tst(OOOOllOlllOlll) 
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mid-range buf : before(0) after(O) 
see Bit 58 
Bit 45 (00011011101110000110111011100000) 
sh high. 9000 
sh h i g h 9500 
sh high 9999 
Bit 46 (00110111011100001101110111000000) 
sh h i g h 9000 
sh h i g h 9500 
sh h i g h 9999 
Bit 47 (01101110111000011011101110000000) 
sh high 9000 
sh h i g h 9500 
sh h i g h 9999 
Bit 50 (01110111000011011101110000100011) 
sh high 9000 
sh h i g h 9500 
sh high 9999 
Firstly, at Bi t 1, one shrinking factor was detected. The next output should start 
at Bi t 16, as the comment in the program output indicates. The next shrinking 
factor was actually detected there. At Bit 19, another shrinking factor was detected. 
However, the next output should have started at Bit 33 but no shrinking factor was 
detected at that point. Hence, this was a wrong detection. 
As can be seen, two lower shrinking factors were correctly detected by the program. 
The program did not find the upper shrinking factors and 3 different upper shrinking 
factors were used. However, the influence of the upper shrinking factors are small and 
so it is possible to correctly obtain the lower shrinking factors. 
Appendix D 
Source code for the LFB combined scheme 
D.l Implementation of LFB combined scheme 
We implemented the LFB combined scheme based on WNC implementation . The 
program was not developed for the practical use but only for the experiment. Since 
the program was to be used to examine the resistance against BH attack, the features 
such as 16 bit substitution and randomly chosen initial model which are irrelevant for 
the experiment, are omitted. 
The key is given by a file in text format. They are as follows. 
• shrinking factor 0 (low) 
• shrinking factor 0 (high) 
• shrinking factor 1 (low) 
• shrinking factor 1 (high) 
• random 128 bits 
The list only includes the new codes and the source files which were modified from 
the original W N C implementation . 
D.2 Source list 
D . 2 . 1 e n c o d e . c 
/* MAIN PROGRAM FOR ENCODING. */ 
#include <stdio.h> 
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#iiiclude <stdlib.h> 
#include "model.h" 
#iiiclude "arithinetic_codiiig.h" 
#iiiclude "secret.h" 
int 
mainCint argc, char* argv[]) 
{ 
if (argc != 3) -C 
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: adaptive_encode low high \ii"); 
return 1; 
} 
initsecret(); 
start_model(); /* Set up other modules. */ 
St art _output iiig_bits 0 ; 
start_encodiiig(atol(argv[l] ) , atol(argv[2] ) ) ; 
for (;;) { /* Loop through characters. */ 
int ch; int symbol; 
ch = getc(stdin); /* Read the next character. */ 
if (ch==EDF) break; /* Exit loop on end-of-file.*/ 
symbol = char_to_indexCch] ; /* Translate to an index. */ 
encode_symbol(symbol,cum_freq); /* Encode that symbol. */ 
update_model(symbol); /* Update the model. */ 
> 
encode_symbol(EOF_symbol,cum_freq); /* Encode the EOF symbol. */ 
done_encoding() ; /* Send the last few bits. */ 
done_outputing_bits(); 
exit(O); 
D.2.2 decode.c 
/* MAIN PROGRAM FOR DECODING. */ 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include "model.h" 
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»include "arithmetic_coding.li" 
ttinclude "secret.h" 
int 
mainCint argc, char* argv[]) 
{ 
if (argc != 3) { 
fprintf(stderr, "Usage: adaptive_decode low high \ii"); 
return 1; 
} 
initsecret0; 
start_inodel() ; /* Set up other modules. */ 
start_inputing_bits(); 
start_decoding(atol(argv[l]), atol(argv[2])); 
for (;;) { /* Loop through characters. */ 
int ch; int symbol; 
symbol = decode_symbol(cum_freq); /* Decode next symbol. */ 
if (symbol==EDF_symbol) break; /* Exit loop if EOF symbol. */ 
ch = index_to_char[symbol]; /* Translate to a character.*/ 
putc(ch,stdout); /* Write that character. */ 
update_model(symbol) ; /* Update the model. */ 
} 
exit(O) ; 
D . 2.3 ar it h m e t ic _enco de. c 
/* ARITHMETIC ENCODING ALGORITHM. */ 
#include <stdio.h> 
#include "arithmetic_coding.h" 
#include "parameter.h" 
#include "secret.h" 
static void bit_plus_follow(); /* Routine that follows */ 
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/* CURRENT STATE OF THE ENCODING. */ 
static code_value low, high; /* Ends of the current code region */ 
static long bits_to_follow; /* Number of opposite bits to output after */ 
/* the next bit. */ 
/* START ENCODING A STREAM OF SYMBOLS. */ 
start_encoding(code_value 1, code_value h) 
{ low = 1; /* Full code range. */ 
high = h; 
bits_to_follow = 0; /* No bits to follow next. */ 
} 
/* ENCODE A SYMBOL. */ 
encode_symbol(symbol,cum.freq) 
int symbol; /* Symbol to encode */ 
int cu2n_freq[] ; /* Cumulative symbol frequencies */ 
{ long range; /* Size of the current code region */ 
range = (long)(high-low)+1; 
high = low + /* Narrow the code region */ 
(range*cum_freqCsymbol-l])/cum_freq[0]-l; /* to that allotted to this */ 
low = low + /* symbol. */ 
(range*cum_freqCsymbol])/cum_freq[0] ; 
for (;;) { /* Loop to output bits. */ 
if (high<Half) { 
bit_plus_follow(0); /* Output 0 if in low half. */ 
} 
else if (low>=Half) { /* Output 1 if in high half.*/ 
bit_plus_follow(l); 
low -= Half; 
high -= Half; /* Subtract offset to top. */ 
} 
else if (low>=First_qtr /* Output an opposite bit */ 
&& high<Third_qtr) { /* later if in middle half. */ 
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bits_to_follow += 1; 
low -= First_qtr; /* Subtract offset to middle*/ 
high -= First_qtr; 
} 
else break; /* Otherwise exit loop. */ 
low = 2*low; 
high = 2*high+l; /* Scale up code range. */ 
> 
range = (long)(high-low)+1; 
high = low + range * SHRINK.VALH / 10000; 
low = low + range * SHRINK.VALL / 10000; 
nextsecret(); 
/* FINISH ENCODING THE STREAM. */ 
done_encoding() 
{ bits_to_follow + = 1 ; /* Output two bits that */ 
if (low<First_qtr) bit_plus_follow(0); /* select the quarter that */ 
else bit_plus_follow(l) ; /* the current code range */ 
} /* contains. */ 
/* OUTPUT BITS PLUS FOLLOWING OPPOSITE BITS. */ 
static void bit_plus_follow(bit) 
int bit; 
{ output_bit(bit); /* Output the bit. */ 
while (bits_to_follow>0) { 
output_bit(!bit); /* Output bits_to_follow */ 
bits_to_follow -= 1; /* opposite bits. Set */ 
} /* bits_to_follow to zero. */ 
D.2.4 arithmetic_decode.c 
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/* ARITHMETIC DECODING ALGORITHM. */ 
#include <stdio.h> 
#iiiclude "aritlimetic_coding.h" 
#include "parameter.h" 
#include "secret.h" 
/* CURRENT STATE OF THE DECODING. */ 
static code_value value; /* Currently-seen code value */ 
static code_value low, high; /* Ends of current code region */ 
/* START DECODING A STREAM OF SYMBOLS. */ 
start_decoding(code_value 1, code_value h) 
{ int i; 
value = 0; /* Input bits to fill the */ 
for (i = 1; i<=Code_value_bits; i++) { /* code value. */ 
value = 2*value+input_bit(); 
} 
low = 1; 
high = h; 
/* DECODE THE NEXT SYMBOL. */ 
int decode_symbol (cuin_freq) 
int cui[i_freq[] ; /* Cumulative symbol frequencies */ 
{ long range; /* Size of current code region */ 
int cum; /* Cumulative frequency calculated */ 
int symbol; /* Symbol decoded */ 
range = (long)(high-low)+1; 
cum = /* Find cum freq for value. */ 
(((long)(value-low)+1)*cum_freq[0]-l)/range ; 
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for (symbol = 1; cum.freq[symbol]>cum; symbol++) ; /* Then find symbol. */ 
high. = low + /* Narrow the code region */ 
(range*cum_freqCsymbol-l])/cum_freq[0]-l; /* to that allotted to this */ 
low = low + /* symbol. */ 
(range*cum_freq [symbol])/cum_freq[0] ; 
for (;;) { /* Loop to get rid of bits. */ 
if (high<Half) { 
/* nothing */ /* Expand low half. */ 
} 
else if (low>=Half) { /* Expand high half. */ 
value -= Half; 
low -= Half; /* Subtract offset to top. */ 
high -= Half; 
} 
else if (low>=First_qtr /* Expand middle half. */ 
&& high<Third_qtr) { 
value -= First_qtr; 
low -= First_qtr; /* Subtract offset to middle*/ 
high -= First_qtr; 
} 
else break; /* Otherwise exit loop. */ 
low = 2*low; 
high = 2*high+l; /* Scale up code range. */ 
value = 2*value+input_bit0; /* Move in next input bit. */ 
} 
range = (long)(high-low)+1; 
high = low + range * SHRINK.VALH / 10000; 
low = low + range * SHRINK.VALL / 10000; 
nextsecret(); 
> 
return symbol; 
D.2.5 secret.h 
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* pann list 
* 1 initial low value 
* 2 initial high value 
* 3 shrinking factor 0 (low) 
* 4 shrinking factor 0 (high) 
* 5 shrinking factor 1 (low) 
* 6 shrinking factor 1 (high) 
* 7 random 128 bits 
*/ 
#define SHRINK.LDW 0 
#define SHRINK.HIGH 1 
#define SHRINK.VALL \ 
(g_shrink[(g_randbit [g_posrandbyte] » g.posrandbit) & 1] [SHRINK.LDW] ) 
#define SHRINK.VALH \ 
(g_shrinkC(g_randbit [g_posrandbyte] » g.posrandbit) & 1] [SHRINK_HIGH]) 
#ifdef SECRET 
long g_shrink[2][2]; 
unsigned char g_randbit[16]; 
int g_posrandbit; 
int g_posrandbyte; 
#else 
extern long g_shrink[2][2]; 
extern unsigned char g_randbit[16] ; 
extern int g_posrandbit; 
extern int g.posrandbyte; 
extern void initsecret(); 
extern void nextsecret(); 
extern void printsecret(FILE* fp) ; 
#endif 
D.2.6 secret.c 
#include <stdio.h> 
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#iiiclude <stdlib.h> 
#define SECRET 
#iiiclude "secret.h" 
#uiidef SECRET 
void initsecretO 
{ 
FILE* fp; 
int cnt; 
char val[3]; 
char buf[256]; 
fp = fopenC'secret", "r") ; 
if (fp == NULL) { 
perrorCcannot open secret file"); 
exit(l); 
} 
/* shrink-0 low */ 
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp) ; 
g_shrink[0]CSHRINK.LOW] = atol(buf); 
/* shrink-0 high */ 
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp); 
g_shrink[0][SHRINK.HIGH] = atol(buf); 
/* shrink-1 low */ 
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp); 
g.shrinkCl][SHRINK.LOW] = atol(buf); 
/* shrink-1 high */ 
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp); 
g.shrinkCl][SHRINK.HIGH] = atol(buf); 
/* random 128 bit sequence */ 
fgets(buf, sizeof(buf), fp); 
val[2] = 
for (cnt = 0; cnt < 16; cnt++) { 
val [0] = buf[cnt * 2]; 
val[1] = buf[cnt * 2 + 1] ; 
g_randbit [cnt] = strtol(val, NULL, 16); 
} 
D.2. Source list 105 
g.posrandbit = 7; 
g.posrandbyte = 0; 
fclose(fp); 
return; 
} 
void 
nextsecret() 
{ 
g_posraiidbit—; 
if (g_posraiidbit < 0) { 
g_posraiidbit = 7; 
g_posraiidbyte++; 
if (g.posrandbyte == 16) 
g_posrandbyte = 0; 
> 
} 
void printsecret(FILE* fp) 
{ 
int cnt; 
fprintfCfp, "sO-l:y.ld\n", g_shriiik[0] [SHRINK.LDW] ) ; 
fprintfCfp, "sO-h:'/.ld\ii", g.shrinkCO] [SHRINK.HIGH] ) ; 
fprintfCfp, "sl-l:y.ld\n", g.shrink [l] [SHRINK.LDW] ) ; 
fprintfCfp, "sl-h:7.1d\n", g_shrink[l] [SHRINK.HIGH] ) ; 
fprintfCfp, "rand:"); 
for Cent = 0; cnt < sizeof Cg_randbit) ; cnt++) 
fprintfCfp, "•/.02x ", g.randbit [cnt] & OxOff) ; 
fprintfCfp, "\n"); 
